## 1NC

### Subsets/Restriction (Short) 1NC

#### Restrictions on authority prohibit-

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

**“Substantially” means the plan must be across the board**

**Anderson et al, 2005**[Brian Anderson, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, WCASS Research / Special Projects Committee\* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy, http://www.specialed.us/issues-504policy/504.htm]

**A substantial limitation is a significant restriction** as to the condition, manner, or duration **under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity** as **compared** **to** **the** condition, manner, or duration under which the **average person in the general population** can perform that same major life activity.¶ The 504 regulation does not define substantial limitation, and the regulation gives discretion to schools to decide what substantial limitation is. The key here is to be consistent internally and to be consistent with pertinent court decisions.¶ **The issue “Does it substantially limit** the major life activity?” **was clarified by the US Supreme Court** decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, **the Supreme Court noted that to meet the “substantially limit” definition**, the **disability must occur across the board** **in multiple environments**, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504 eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s life, not only in school.

**Violation: texas limits justifications not practice- and they limit a subset of “armed forces”**

**Vote neg  
limits and ground- anything can indirectly affect war powers--hundreds of tiny armed forces affs overburden neg prep -- enforcing precision is key to predictable division of ground**

### Genocide PIC 1NC (:30

#### [FIX TEXT]

#### The United States Federal Government should statutorily prohibit the war powers authority of president to introduce the United States Armed Forces into hostilities for humanitarian intervention except in cases of genocide, defined as per the Engle evidence

#### intervening to stop genocide is morally required

Engle 7 Their Author (The part of the article they excise--“article continues, a few pages later”) Karen, PhD, W. H. Francis, Jr. Professor in Law; Director, Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice, University of Texas School of Law, “Calling in the Troops”:The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention”, 190 Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 20

1. Genocide

If there were one instance that most would agree warrants intervention— even in the absence of Security Council action—it would be genocide. Ge-nocide in Rwanda prompted the U.N. to revisit its understanding of what constitutes a “breach of peace and security,” and the argument that genocide was occurring in Kosovo (itself a contested proposition) fueled a justification for NATO intervention. The slogan “Never Again” invokes the Holocaust and World War II, indicating that, even though we had hoped to have installed an international criminal and human rights regime to prevent further genocides, we know there are times when we must resort to force when all else fails. Because genocide is the most agreed-upon basis for intervention, the definition of genocide has become contested, and advocates for intervention have spent much energy attempting to convince potential interveners that military assistance is necessary to respond to or prevent genocide. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question of whether what was happening could be considered genocide was central to determining the role the United States would play in promoting military intervention. Samantha Power details the debate surrounding the “g-word”83 in the early 1990s and notes that opponents of intervention were careful not to discuss the conflict in terms of genocide. Indeed, “[t]he Bush administration assiduously avoided using the word. ‘Genocide’ was shunned because a genocide finding would create a moral imperative.”84 As a result, officials opposing intervention spoke in terms of ethnic cleansing: “[National Security Advisor] Scowcroft believes genocide would have demanded a U.S. response, but ethnic cleansing, which is the label he uses for what occurred in Bosnia, did not . . . .”85 Scowcroft explained that “there is something of a national interest in preventing genocide because the United States needs to appear to be upholding international law.”86 For Scowcroft, at least, ethnic cleansing would not require the same response. This reluctance to label the Bosnian conflict genocide resurfaced during Clinton Administration’s treatment of both Bosnia and Rwanda. John Shattuck, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, has since explained: The genocide debate, which had begun in the Bush administration and would be repeated in the spring of 1994 in the case of Rwanda, reflected the reluctance of U.S. policymakers to confront the responsibility of countries that had ratified the Genocide Convention “to prevent and punish” crimes determined to constitute genocide. For this reason I could not get State Depart-ment clearance to use the term “genocide” to describe what was happening in Bosnia or Rwanda.87 As an illustration of this general equation of “genocide” and the responsibility to intervene, both Shattuck and Power refer to a State Department memorandum in 1994 that cautioned against investigating the possibility of Genocide Convention violations: “Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—genocide finding could commit the U.S. government to actually ‘do something.’ ” 88 Shattuck notes, “Although this memo mischaracterizes the State Department Legal Adviser’s objection to official use of the term ‘genocide’ as based on ‘legal’ rather than ‘policy’ issues, it certainly reflects the bureaucracy’s nervousness over the issue.”89 If avoiding the label of genocide is a way to prevent intervention, the opposite is also true: calling something genocide is a way to require intervention. Thus when the U.S. Congress declared in the summer of 2004 that ethnic cleansing in Darfur constituted genocide,90 presidential candidate John Kerry demanded that President Bush organize a U.N. military intervention. Eventually, the Bush Administration called the events in Darfur “genocide” and began to pressure the U.N. to do the same.91 Of course, by that time, Iraq had cost the Bush Administration a significant amount of credibility, and the United States likely was unable to provide the troops necessary for intervention.92 The vast majority of the policymakers and international law scholars who equate a finding of genocide with a responsibility to protect, and vice versa, rely on the Genocide Convention to make their argument. In particular, advocates for intervention often find legal basis in Article 1 of the Convention, which states that genocide is a “crime under international law” and that parties to the Convention agree to “undertake to prevent and punish” acts of genocide.93 Even though the Convention is nearly sixty years old, this form of argument seems to only have been made this way in the past few years.94 As already discussed, the Genocide Convention was at the heart of internal Clinton Administration debates about how to label the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda,95 and the understanding that a finding of genocide triggers humanitarian intervention under the Convention has permeated public as well as scholarly discourse. Journalist David Rieff, for example, has said when discussing Rwanda that “U.N. and Western officials—and officials of a good many African states as well—tried to avoid using the word ‘genocide’ for as long as possible.”96 The reluctance to use the word “genocide” exists because it “has entailments. Its use confers obligations. Had it been used while the killing was going on, those countries that had ratified the Genocide Convention of 1948 would have been required to intervene to bring it to an end.”97 When President Bush, in a somewhat surprising reversal, broke with the U.N. and referred to the events in Darfur as genocide rather than a crime against humanity, the Washington Post attributed the semantic debate to the Genocide Convention: “Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, recently dispatched by Bush to survey the situation in Darfur, has said he was trying to avoid the debate over what to call the killing of tens of thousands of Africans over the past two years.”98 The Post then matter-of-factly informed its readers by way of explanation: “The United States, under the 1948 U.N. convention on genocide, is committed to preventing such killings and punishing the killers if it deems a genocide is taking place.”99 For some, deploying the Genocide Convention to justify intervention provides a legal basis for distinguishing between the consequences of findings of genocide and that of findings of crimes against humanity or even ethnic cleansing. The latter might permit or even require humanitarian intervention— as the U.N. currently maintains, even with regard to Darfur— but decisions would presumably have to be made on a case-by-case basis. In the interpretation commonly given to the Genocide Convention today, though, once a conflict meets the genocide threshold, there seems to be significant agreement that signatory states have some responsibility to respond. 100 The Genocide Convention, then, both offers a vehicle to limit intervention and raises the stakes for those who would like to see intervention in a given situation. However justified, the exceptional status given to genocide generates special consideration for claims that violations of human rights—whether killings, torture, or rape—constitute genocide. If one wants to see military intervention for reasons other than self-defense, genocide provides the firmest ground. Particularly in situations that might otherwise be characterized as civil war, genocide is the trump card that permits, if not requires, intervention. Of course, the more it is accepted that genocide demands intervention, the more the question of what constitutes genocide becomes contested. And the more intervention is limited to genocide, the more the definitional boundaries of genocide will be challenged by those making claims for intervention. Former Secretary-General of Medicins Sans Frontieres Alain Destexhe complained in 1995 that the term “genocide” had become “dangerously commonplace,”101 and that it was increasingly being used to “shock people [into paying attention] to contemporary situations that reflect varying degrees of violence or injustice.”102 Concerned that genocide has become “the victim of its own success,”103 Destexhe calls for a limited definition of genocide, one that would only recognize three genocides in the twentieth century (that of the Armenians by the Young Turks, the Jews and Gypsies by the Nazis, and the Tutsis by the Hutus).104 Although I do not necessarily agree with Destexhe’s definition, I do agree with his observation about how the term “genocide” has been deployed for its shock, or crisis, value.

### Iran Ptx: Pitt-IU—1NC

#### Obama is winning the fight against a new Iran sanctions bill but PC is key to sustain democratic momentum against its passage

Lockshin 1-21 (Matt, senior campaign manager and online organizer at CREDO Action, “A Big Day for Diplomacy With Iran,” 2014, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-lockshin/a-big-day-for-diplomacy-w_b_4632941.html>

**Monday could go down in history as the day we took our first step toward a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that prevents the country from** ever **acquiring a nuclear weapon**. But the peaceful resolution of international concerns about Iran's nuclear program is hardly assured.Those of us who support diplomacy have an important role to play in preventing members of the **House and the Senate** -- Democrats and Republicans -- who are **unwilling to give President Obama the** time and political spacenecessary to cut a reasonable deal with Iran. Where We Are Now On Monday, Iran began to implement an interim deal it has made with the United States and our international partners. Iran's nuclear program is now frozen and subject to the most intrusive inspections in history. And for the next six months, while Iran's nuclear program is halted, negotiators will try to reach a comprehensive diplomatic agreement between Iran, the United States and various world powers to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. President **Obama has been a strong voice for peace** despite opposition from many within his own party. **Now** more than ever**, he needs** our strong and vocal support. These negotiations represent the best chance in a decade to resolve this issue peacefully. But they will be tough, both substantively and politically. President Obama himself has only given the talks a 50/50 chance of success. The stakes of these talks are high. **The alternative to a negotiated deal will be** either a continually growing Iranian nuclear program or another American war in the Middle East. So **we shouldn't take** **counterproductive actions that make** the **negotiations** even **harder** than they need to be. Yet **that is** precisely what hawks in both chambers of Congress are trying to do. The Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - New Sanctions. Among the leading political dangers to diplomatic talks is the belligerent and reckless move to impose new sanctions on Iran while negotiations are ongoing, in violation of our commitment to our international partners and Iranian diplomats as part of an interim nuclear deal. In December, news broke that 14 Senate Democrats led by New Jersey's Robert Menendez and New York's Chuck Schumer had joined Republicans (led by Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois) in pushing a new sanctions bill (S. 1881) that would blow up diplomacy with Iran and set us on a path to war. Initially, the new sanctions bill seemed to have momentum. But last week the momentum shifted in our favor, due in no small part to those who flooded the Senate with calls demanding that Senate Democrats not help the Republicans start another war. And as of this morning, there are more Senate Democrats on the record opposing new sanctions at this time than there are Democratic co-sponsors of the new sanctions bill. The National Iranian American Council, an organization that does great work supporting diplomacy with Iran, has a nice breakdown of where various senators stand on new sanctions. You can see their whip count, here. The Second Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - Tying President Obama's Hands Iran is currently under an extremely onerous sanctions regime. Sanctions have already crippled the Iranian economy and led to widespread economic pain, like rampant unemployment and shortages of medicine and other humanitarian supplies. While the purpose of sanctions has never been to punish ordinary Iranians, they are the ones who overwhelmingly feel the pain caused by sanctions. It's widely understood that if a deal is struck, the basic contours would be our agreeing to ease sanctions with a goal of ending them in exchange for a verifiable agreement with Iran that prevents it from ever building a nuclear weapon. But some members of Congress want to move the goalposts and are trying to pass legislation that lays out the contours of what an acceptable final deal than ends sanctions would look like -- and the standards they want to establish are so unrealistic that nothing that's actually on the table would ever satisfy them. This kind of legislation is not only dangerous if it passes. Iranian diplomats are less likely to go out on a limb and agree to potentially politically unpopular provisions if they don't believe Congress will back up President Obama by supporting the deal he cuts. The bottom line is that Congress needs to give President Obama the space he needs to cut a reasonable deal. Legislation that seeks to tie his hands not only makes it less likely that diplomacy will succeed (which in turn makes war much more likely), it also makes it more likely that the failure of diplomacy would be blamed (perhaps justifiably) on the United States. What Can We Do Now? The short version is that we need to do all that we can to provide time and space for the administration to negotiate a verifiable deal that protects our interests and advances our security in a peaceful manner. Congress will try to prevent that, and it's our job to ensure that it doesn't. In terms of strategy, we need to keep the pressure on Democrats in both chambers of Congress not to help the Republicans start another war. Senate Democrats are our top targets. Although momentum has slowed on the new Iran sanctions bill, we remain in a dangerous position. If anything goes even a little awry in the ongoing negotiations, then move for new sanctions can quickly regain momentum. Getting more Democratic senators on the record opposing new sanctions now is a priority, as is holding accountable those who are pushing for new sanctions. In the House, we need to make sure Democrats don't give bipartisan support to any bill, even a non-binding resolution, supporting new sanctions or setting down markers about what an acceptable final deal will look like. And Democrats in both chambers need to be reminded that should President Obama cut a reasonable deal with Iran, we will need them to back him up by passing legislation that reduces sanctions in exchange for a verifiable agreement that stops Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear bomb.

#### **Plan destroys Obama**

Loomis 7 Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### DA turns the aff—sanctions are structural violence

Muhammad Sahimi, Professor, University of Southern California and Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, former researcher, Oxford Research Group, “The Unfolding Human Catastrophe in Iran,” ALJAZEERA, 10—28—12, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/20121023101710641121.html>

Apart from the vague and shifting red lines which continue to afflict the thick fog of Western national security rhetoric vis-a-vis Iran, not a single word was uttered by either men about the plight and suffering of the Iranian people who have had no role in the decisions made by the Islamic Republic's leaders. But, the fact is that the sanctions, exacerbated by government incompetence, have the potential to give rise to a major human catastrophe. The lack of sensitivity to the plight of ordinary Iranians was - at least on the President's part - surprising, because when his administration together with the European Union began imposing sanctions on Iran, they promised the world that the sanctions will be "smart" and "targeted". The world was promised that the sanctions will not hurt millions of ordinary Iranians who go about their daily lives and, in fact, oppose many of their government's policies. But, the sanctions are now in full force, and are hurting the same people who we were told were not meant to be their target, in what is yet another case of "collateral damage" inflicted by Western policy towards Iran, and its disenfranchised people who have lost control over their destiny at both home and abroad. In fact, there are very strong indications that a human catastrophe could emerge whose scale poses as much a threat as an outright military attack. The supposedly "smart" and "targeted" sanctions have been increasingly expanded to all areas, even if they are not part of the official sphere of sanctions. This is intentional, even if Western leaders tell us otherwise. To avoid criticisms of the type that they were confronted with after they imposed all-encompassing sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, the US and its EU allies have imposed sanctions on Iran's Central Bank and practically all other Iranian banks that are involved in commercial transactions with the outside world. Since these banks open lines of credit for imports, and provide financial guarantees for commerce with the outside world, it has become very difficult, if not impossible, to import vital goods and products into the country, even those that absolutely have nothing to do with the military, or oil, or the nuclear programme. In effect, this is the type of sanctions imposed on Iraq, but in a supposedly more "humanitarian" way. An area that has been hit very hard is the pharmaceutical sector. Although Iran produces a large part of the medicines and drugs that its population needs, based on the generic versions of brand-named pharmaceuticals, it is still unable to produce the most advanced drugs that have come to the market over the past 10 to 15 years that deal with a variety of serious illnesses, simply because their generic versions are not yet available. As a result, Iran must still import a significant amount of drugs every year to address the needs of the Iranian people when dealing with such illnesses as leukaemia, AIDS, and others. But, the sanctions imposed on Iran's banks and financial institutions have effectively prevented Iran from importing the necessary drugs and the associated chemicals. At the same time, as Iran's oil exports continue to decrease due to the sanctions strain on the country’s resources, it becomes increasingly difficult to pay for the expensive imported drugs, even if a way can be found for importing them. As a pharmacist in Tehran said, "The warehouses for pharmaceutics are empty because we cannot import what we need due to the sanctions, and even if we could, we do not have the resources to pay for them due to the sanctions." As a result, the shortage of drugs has all the makings of a human catastrophe. According to recent estimates as many as 6 million patients are currently being affected by the impact of sanctions on the import and manufacture of medications inside Iran. This has prompted many of Iran's healthcare professionals to raise their voices, and begin protesting the impending danger they're witnessing before their eyes. The board of directors of the Iranian Haemophilia Society recently informed the World Federation of Haemophilia (IFH) that the lives of tens of thousands of children are being endangered by the lack of proper drugs as a consequence of international economic sanctions imposed on Iran. According to the letter that the Society's board sent to the IFH, while the export of drugs to Iran has not been banned, the sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and the country's other financial institutions have severely disrupted the purchase and transfer of medicines. Describing itself as a non-political organisation that has been active for 45 years, the Society condemned [FA] the "inhumane and immoral" US and EU sanctions and appealed to international organisations for help. Some statistics are very telling. Tens of thousands of Iranian boys and young men are haemophilic and need certain drugs that must be imported. Many of them may need surgery for a variety of reasons, but in the absence of proper drugs for their haemophilia illness, the surgeries cannot be performed, because the bleeding could not be stopped. Several credible reports from Iran indicate that surgeries for all haemophilic patients have been cancelled, and at least a few have already died.There are about 37,000 Iranians with MS, a debilitating disease that can be controlled only with advanced medications; otherwise, the patients will die. In fact, three members of one of our extended families in Iran are afflicted with multiple sclerosis. Furthermore, given that even under the best medical conditions 40,000 Iranians lose their lives to cancer every year, and that it has been predicted by many medical experts that Iran will have a "cancer tsunami" by 2015 as every year 70,000 to 80,000 new cases of cancer are identified in Iran, the gravity of the situation becomes even more perilous. Fatemeh Hashemi, head of Iran's Charity Foundation for Special Diseases, which cares for the needs of patients with life-threatening diseases, including a variety of cancers in adult patients as well as children, heart diseases, lung problems, multiple sclerosis (MS), and thalassemia, recently wrote a letter to United Nations' Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The Foundation has been a highly successful nonpolitical organisation that, in addition to Iran, has also served many people in Iraq and Afghanistan, and whose work has been recognised by the UN. In her letter Hashemi said that she leads an organisation "with 6 million patients and, hence, in contact with 30 per cent of Iran's total population". Emphasising the non-political nature of her organisation and her letter, Hashemi added: "Although drugs have not been sanctioned, due to the impossibility of paying for the imported drugs through the banking system, the heavy shadow of the sanctions is felt in the health sector. Not only has importing drugs been disrupted, importing the raw chemicals [for the drugs that Iran does produce] has also been disrupted... As a human activist, I call on humanity's conscience to pay attention to the fact that, despite the claims by those that have imposed the sanctions, their pressure is having its destructive effect on the life and health of the people." Hence, the supposedly "smart" and "targeted" sanctions that were not going to hurt the ordinary Iranians have been inflicting significant damage on the Iranian people. The net result is that shortage of drugs for patients with serious and life-threatening illnesses is becoming chronic in Iran, and is reaching hazardous levels. Meanwhile, recent reports indicate that two large plants that produce drugs for a variety of illnesses have also been closed. The reason is that it has become essentially impossible to import the chemical compounds used in the production of the drugs, due to the sanctions imposed on Iran's financial institutions that deal with the outside world. The world must recognise that in certain respects the path taken by the United States and its allies is eerily similar to what was done to Iraq in the 1990s. The United Nation's UNICEF estimated that the sanctions imposed on Iraq caused the death of up to 500,000 Iraqi children. Given that Iran's population is three times that of Iraq, if the sanctions imposed on Iran last several years - as they did with Iraq - the number of dead resulting from them could be larger than that of Iraq. Moreover, given that Iran still imports a significant amount of wheat, rice and other food products, if the sanctions drag on, not only could hundreds of thousands of Iranians die due to shortage of drugs and medical goods, the shortage of food could also become very significant. It should also be noted, if only in passing, that sanctions did not change the policy of Saddam Hussein's regime. Thus, after causing the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children, those who had been jockeying for war with Iraq all along argued that the sanctions had failed, and "regime change" was the only alternative. As we now know Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, nor was it trying to produce them. Iran also does not have nuclear weapons yet, but Western policy has the power to change the Iranian leadership's calculus and make it seem like the only viable option remaining with the power to guarantee regime survival. In sum, comprehensive sanctions not only killed thousands in Iraq, but they eventually laid the path to war. One key difference in the case of Iran is of course that one of its few lifelines to the outside world is still China, which depends on Iranian energy to abet its ongoing economic expansion, hardly a commendable development for those supporting human rights and entertaining hopes of democratisation in the Islamic Republic. The sanctions have arguably failed to meaningfully shift the stance of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who most recently emphasised that the Islamic Republic is prepared to negotiate and has in fact never left the negotiating table, but will not be cowed into submission. So, if, for instance, Iran is expected to forgo 19.75 per cent uranium enrichment and close the underground Fordow enrichment facility, two of the P5+1's key demands at the Baghdad and Moscow talks, there must be some form of quid pro quo. Without one, there is no incentive for Iran to cooperate in an atmosphere already severely afflicted by a longstanding deficit of trust. There have been rumblings and rumours of possible sanctions relief after the US presidential election but nothing tangible as of yet. There are many voices within Iran that have called on the leadership to find a compromise with the West. The US and its allies can make such voices stronger and louder if they offer to lift some of the sanctions, or at least have exceptions that allow Iran's financial system to be involved in the import of vital goods and products with no military or nuclear applications, such as drugs and food stuffs. It may be useless to preach to the Obama administration about the human, moral, and ethical toll of its policy toward Iran, given that the President has in many respects perpetuated the destructive Middle East policy of George W Bush, which in Iran's case has been even tougher and more damaging to the livelihood of the Iranian people. But, the emerging catastrophe will be an ethical and moral problem for the West for decades to come, a catastrophe that is being created simply because Western governments appear to blindly pursue crippling sanctions against Iran as an end in themselves, as opposed to a means by which to further the diplomatic process. Given the tragic history of the US intervention in Iran in the past, it is be prudent to rethink the consequences of such blind sanctions, and their effect on the thinking of the Iranian people about the US - a largely pro-US population in one of the most turbulent areas in the world that has been known for its hostility towards the United States and its perceived negative impact in much of the region.

#### Sanction bill guarantees US backing of Israeli strikes on Iran – encourages Israel to act

Perr 12/24/13 – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon. Jon has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002). (Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

**Global war**

**Trabanco 9** – Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at anytime,” \*\*http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762\*\*)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. **Teheran will** unquestionably **resort to** its **proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah** (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) **to carry out attacks** against Israel, America and their allies, effectively **setting in flames** a large portion of **the Middle East**. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such **conflict could** rapidlyspiral out of control and thus a relatively **minor clash could** quickly **and** dangerously **escalate by engulfing the whole region and** perhaps even **beyond**. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (**America, Russia**, Europe, **China**). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### Courts CP

#### The United States federal government should judicially prohibit the President from introducing the armed forces into conflict for humanitarian intervention

#### Solves the executive

Terry M. Moe**,** Professor, Political Science, Stanford University and William G. Howell, Graduate Student, Political Science, Stanford University, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory,” PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY v. 29 n. 4, December 1999, p. 850+.

In some sense, then, the judges on the Supreme Court can do what they want in resolving the ambiguities of presidential power. They have the autonomy to clamp down on presidents, if that is what their policy interests or legal philosophies or the integrity of the institution require. And they have the autonomy to do just the opposite, depending again on how they see the issue. Similarly, their autonomy allows them to safeguard the prestige of their institution by responding to public opinion and other aspects of the political environment. When presidents take unilateral actions that are distinctly unpopular, the Court can add to its prestige by declaring their actions illegal. And when presidents take unilateral actions that are popular, the Court can add to its own prestige by upholding him.

#### Solves their deliberation offense

Christine Bateup (historical scholar and JSD Candidate at NYU, 06. (71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1109, “The Dialogic Promise Assessing The Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue,” ln)

The most prominent descriptions of constitutional dialogue in this vein have been developed by Barry Friedman and by Robert Post and Reva Siegel. 184 Friedman's is the most positive account, as it is explicitly grounded in social science studies regarding institutional interactions between the [\*1158] judiciary, the political branches, and the people. 185 These studies show that while the Supreme Court has significant leeway in making pronouncements, if it strays too far from what the other branches of government and the people accept, political constraints such as the power of judicial appointments and popular backlash will bring the Court back into line. 186 Friedman relies on this evidence principally to stress the role of public opinion as one of the principal forces controlling the Court. Although this mechanism is not understood perfectly, social science evidence increasingly suggests that judicial outcomes tend to run in line with public opinion over the longer term. 187 While these studies show that the Court is heavily constrained, Friedman argues that judicial decisions still play an important function in the constitutional system as they serve to spark (or continue) a broader national discussion about constitutional meaning. 188 As a result, the Court acts as the shaper and facilitator of society-wide discussion about constitutional values. When it declares its own views about the meaning of constitutional text, the Court actively channels and fosters ongoing societal debate by synthesizing the various, and possibly disparate, views about constitutional meaning and by articulating that debate in an explicitly constitutional form. 189 [\*1159] In the process, the Court also mediates the views of different participants in the debate and focuses the terms in which future debate might proceed. The Court's decisions then facilitate further debate, either by acting as a catalyst for discussion along particular lines or by prodding other institutions into deliberative action**.** As a result of these dynamics, Friedman describes the function of judicial review in the United States constitutional system as one of promoting and facilitating constitutional dialogue. 190 The Court's participation in this dialogue is dynamic -- not only does it spark a process of national discussion, but it is also, in turn, affected and shaped by this conversation. 191 When a decision is rendered it is subject to discussion and debate within society. Over time, if there is enough popular disagreement with the Court's ruling, new legislation may be passed and legal challenges brought that test the finality of the decision in a more concrete sense. As a result of this dissent and debate, the Court may ultimately come to reconsider and refashion its decision. Under this model, the perspectives of non-judicial actors may therefore influence the Court as much, if not more, than the Court itself influences the rest of society. 192 Over time, this process produces a relatively enduring constitutional equilibrium that is widely accepted by all the participants in the national discussion. Friedman further argues that the dialogic role the judiciary performs is a valuable one, as it "achieves the separation of constitutional requirements from immediate political preferences," 193 and, in the long term, the production of [\*1160] stable and broadly supported answers to questions of constitutional meaning. 194

### Advantage

#### Humanitarian Justifications solve war- “pretext wars” are wrong

By Ryan Goodman 6 \* ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf

\*\*NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Second, the plausibility of a humanitarian justification may depend on how it is expressed in conjunction with other rationales for using force. According to a standard version of the pre- text model, state R will employ a humanitarian exception to conceal its ulterior motives. On this view, the availability of an authorized humanitarian justification would suppress the artic- ulation of other reasons for escalating hostilities. Similarly, state R would have difficulty in pro- claiming humanitarianism as the reason for using force if the proclamation is superficially attached to existing objectives. A meager, formal reference to humanitarianism while military efforts are obviously pursued for other reasons should not obtain the political benefits of a pub- licly legitimated use of force. The important point is that state R will need to invest consid- erably in a humanitarian rationale-possibly to the relative exclusion of other (generally less justifiable) reasons. This factor may partially explain why past uses of a humanitarian rationale failed to gain meaningful political traction, even though the factual predicate was potentially meritorious (an issue that I explore later with respect to the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq). Some of the points just discussed might cast doubt on whether a humanitarian rationale can alter the course of events if leaders have already embarked on different justifications; that is, preexisting public rationales may preclude leaders from reframing a dispute along humanitar- ian lines. This observation raises a legitimate concern but does not undermine the present anal- ysis of UHI. First, to the extent that preexisting rationales foreclose the promulgation of alter- native rationales, the pretext objection to legalizing UHI loses its force; that is, concerns about states' abuse of a humanitarian exception are misplaced or exaggerated if leaders are unable to succeed with a justification after having espoused an earlier one.134 Second, such consider- ations regarding the impact of preexisting rationale should, if anything, add support to the project of fashioning institutions to take account of empirical patterns of state practice. The prospect of early lock-ins simply helps to establish the tasks for institutional design. Accord- ingly, in part III, I propose some institutional reforms to encourage the early and emphatic articulation of humanitarian purposes in interstate disputes. Third, recall that the studies on MIDs recognize that multiple issues might be at stake in a dispute. The question is: which issue becomes the principal claim raised by the revisionist state. A humanitarian claim need not com- pletely replace or retire an earlier claim; in such cases, it is more a matter of emphasis.135 Finally, if the assertion of humanitarian claims only supplements-rather than displaces- other issues, a road to war may yet be averted. One means for defusing a crisis involves issue linkage. Accordingly, the introduction of humanitarian issues can facilitate conflict resolution by expanding bargaining opportunities for trade-offs with other issues in a dispute.'36 More- over, studies of international crises suggest that issue linkage is more likely to succeed when the salience ascribed to an issue is different for the disputing parties'37-a situation we should expect to occur when the issue involves human rights conditions in one of the countries. Another means for defusing a crisis is to facilitate face-saving compromises. As Senese and Vasquez posit, other disputed issues can propel leaders unwittingly to a point at which they have trouble "bail[ing] out." In this context, the addition of humanitarian issues might reduce the political costs of such a reversal. An "important finding related to crisis bargaining," accord- ing to a leading review of the literature by Paul Huth, is that the inclusion of secondary issues can allow leaders to take politically sensitive, pacifying steps that avert war: [D]iplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and nego- tiate on secondary issues, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security issues ... can help leaders of attacker states to retreat from their threats by reducing the domestic or international political costs of backing away from a military confrontation. Leaders can claim that defender concessions on certain issues were a major gain, or that a defender's willingness to negotiate was a promising diplomatic development. In either case, foreign policy leaders can use even limited accommodative diplomatic actions of the defender to fend off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim that the government of the would-be attacker state has retreated under pressure.38 In Huth's own work on territorial disputes, he notes that humanitarian issues can provide these types of opportunities for deescalation: [T]o induce the challenger to make concessions, the terms of a settlement need to be formulated so that leaders can counter charges of appeasement and capitulation. Thus, if claims to territory have to be withdrawn, some form of concessions by the target on policies within the disputed territory (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities) may be critical to pack- aging a politically viable agreement. 39 For such a tactic to work, however, the secondary issue would presumably need to be perceived as a genuine part of the dispute.

#### humanitarian justifications displace security justifications--that causes war- world war 1 and crimean war prove

By Ryan Goodman 6 \* ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf

\*\*NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

In Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Jack Snyder identifies deeper forms of socialization that may result from leaders' efforts to justify the escalation of hostilities with another state. He hypothesizes and ultimately concludes that logrolling among domestic political coalitions explains incidents of self-defeating expansionism by powerful states. The empirical evidence compels Snyder to conclude that blowback effects have signif- icant explanatory power.107 In several cases that Snyder studies, government officials and opin- ion leaders promulgated "strategic myths" to justify expansionist policies, and these images were internalized by members of the public, elites, and, at times, proponents of the rational- izations themselves.108 For example, in the Crimean War, members of the British ruling party promoted conceptions of Russian hostility and other security-based rationales to justify foreign military ventures.109 The same leaders later found themselves unable to rescind bellicose pol- icies due to hardened public and elite opinions formed around the original myths.110 In a com- parable effort to justify military ambitions, leaders of Wilhelmine Germany supported stra- tegic myths about the aggressive intentions of potential adversaries (Britain and Russia), the definition of a favorable balance ofpower, the German nation's relative strengths, and the pros- pects of success."1 The German leadership was subsequently unable to change course once powerful domestic actors internalized those conceptions. The domestic groups came to expect and demand aggressive behavior abroad and became increasingly unable to recognize flaws in contemporary policies."2 Notably, other scholars' examinations of the historical cases largely support Snyder's conclusions.113 In addition, Charles Kupchan extends these theoretical explanations to strategic myths used to justify self-defeating cooperative foreign policy agendas (not only self-defeating competitive agendas)."14 As these historical cases suggest, blowback effects may occur (with some variation) across different regime types-that is, across a range of domestic political systems. This point may appear surprising. One might suppose that illiberal states would be relatively unresponsive to public opinion and thus not susceptible to blowback effects. On this view, such regimes lack internal mechanisms of accountability to exert pressure on governmental leaders. Recent research on state behavior and military conflict, however, provides a more nuanced account. That research suggests the importance of disaggregating illiberal states and understanding internal constraints on political coalitions in nondemocracies.115 Specifically, Snyder finds that two types of regimes are highly prone to experiencing blowback: nondemocratic regimes governed by cartels and democratic regimes with significant cartelization.116 He identifies two features that accentuate blowback effects in such cases. First, logrolling among cartels encour- ages the maintenance of strategic myths."17 Second, a free press and open political space-in- stitutions that illiberal states lack-provide important checks on strategic mythmaking.118 Members of the cartelized groups internalize (or fail to distinguish strategic from genuine) dis- course justifying military expansion; they can also become entrapped by justificatory discourse used to mobilize mass support for the military effort."19

To help explain internalization, Snyder's findings can be usefully supplemented with studies of"bureaucratic politics." Lebow contends that once governmental leaders have propounded a guiding rationale and beliefs with respect to a crisis situation, subordinate organs and individuals within the governmental bureaucracy are often loath to contest, and eager to substan- tiate, those commitments. 20 Lebow calls this dynamic "cognitive closure." 21 Another scholar has appropriately redescribed the dynamic as sociological in nature, however, and has thus con- ceptualized the effect as "social closure."'22 In a similar vein, Kupchan identifies institutional effects that produce bureaucratic conformity: "Even if strategic images are crafted primarily for public consumption, they gradually spread through the top-level elite community, the bureau- cracy, and the military services. They become, as it were, organizing principles for the broader decision-making community."'23 As a result, members of the bureaucracy become less directed by "inference-based strategic pragmatism" or by "strategic conceptions informed by logic alone."124 The originating rationales, along with associated beliefs about the conflict, shape their subsequent actions.

The politics of justification contain three lessons for regulating humanitarian intervention. First, the institution of war is often founded upon a process of justification, with audiences potentially including the public, elites, or members of the governing coalition.125 Second, the rationales that leaders contrive to justify hostilities can meaningfully shape the content of social and political discourse. Accordingly, there are strong reasons to believe that justifying hostil- ities on the basis of humanitarian purposes can shift the terms of the conflict by disrupting com- peting rationales or, more affirmatively, by establishing humanitarian issues as the dominant framework for the dispute. The articulation of a humanitarian justification can produce (through various causal pathways such as strategic manipulation by political actors, internal- ization by relevant members of society, and bureaucratic conformity) a new normative equi- librium and shared beliefs about the conflict, its aims, the interests at stake, and the attributes and inclinations of the opposing state. Third, an important consequence of new beliefs and normative commitments taking root is the constraint placed on subsequent action. Though slightly dramatic, one scholar describes blowback effects as "the Procrustean bed that decision- makers create for themselves when, after persuading the public of a theory which justifies [mil- itary] expansion, they can no longer diverge from it.""26 In short, these effects suggest the potential strength and durability of humanitarian justifications for escalating hostilities.

#### humanitarian interventions are highly effective

Western and Goldstein 11

JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age?page=show

To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before. Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day. Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.” Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was “morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, international actors did not abandon intervention or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, amid the violence, major intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection. A key turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions, the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999 by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the criticisms formulated in response to the botched campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are outdated. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force. Conversely, a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against civilians. This is because, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, interventions aimed at preventing mass atrocities often force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign, means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities. Yet the statistical record shows exactly the opposite. Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined. During the Arab Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in maintaining order and restoring justice. Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed. And because of successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a marked decline in violence resulting from civil war. According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989. Still, although international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing, demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.

#### best data proves

Charles T. Call and, American University, Elizabeth M. Cousens, UN Mission in Nepal, ¶ Article first published online: 1 FEB 2008¶ “Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies” International Studies Perspectives¶ Volume 9, Issue 1, pages 1–21, February 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00313.x

Does International Peacebuilding Make a Difference?

By either minimalist or moderate standards, there is increasingly robust evidence that international involvement can be an important factor in success, though we would argue that the evidence remains largely correlative rather than causal and therefore wanting for finer-grained analysis of causality and impact. First, there is a macro correlation in the dramatic rise in international peace activities, including mediation and peacekeeping, alongside the dramatic drop in number and intensity of wars. Andrew Mack makes this argument particularly forcefully (Mack 2005, 2007). Doyle and Sambanis (2006), who focus expressly on peacebuilding, also tell a positive story.¶ Equally interesting are findings about the comparative effectiveness of the UN. Nicholas Sambanis and J. Schulhofer-Wohl (2005) find that the United Nations significantly increases the prospects for successful peacebuilding, in contrast to a more lackluster performance of non-UN operations.13 Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2006:90) show that 2 years after war termination, civil wars with any form of UN operation were nearly twice as likely to enjoy success in the form of “participatory peacebuilding” as conflicts without a UN presence (13 out of 27, or 48%, compared to 24 out of 94, or 26% of conflicts). They find that UN missions, especially those with multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, significantly reduce the chances of large-scale violence and enhance chances for minimal political democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:114).14Collier et al. (2006:14) develop a model that indicates that doubling peacekeeping expenditures would reduce the risk of war reversion from 40% to 31% within 10 years. Former U.S. official James Dobbins also finds the UN more effective when compared to United States’ efforts at what he calls “nation-building” (Dobbins 2005; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005).15 This is even more impressive if one factors in that the UN is often sent into tough cases where national or regional actors are less likely to tread (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).16

#### double bind- EITHER attitudes are resilient to a single debate, OR squo solves- their stolz ev is about the TVPA- which already happened

Stolz 7 - their author Their Author (Barbara, political scientist / criminologist, July, “Interpreting the U.S. Human Trafficking Debate Through the Lens of Symbolic Politics.”, Law and Policy, 2007, Vol. 29 Issue , p311-338 st)

By enacting the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, U.S. policymakers¶ acknowledged trafficking in persons as criminal behavior, punishable under¶ federal law. The legislation was developed through the congressional policymaking¶ process, usually studied from the perspective of who gets what, when, and¶ how. To expand our understanding of criminal justice policymaking, this article¶ analyzes the act from an alternative perspective—symbolic politics. It examines how¶ the act performs symbolic functions identified in the criminal justice literature—¶ reassuring the law abiding/threatening the lawbreaker, communicating a moral¶ message, providing a model for the states, and educating about a problem.¶ The thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1865,¶ abolished the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude throughout¶ the nation. Acknowledging that current practices of slavery and trafficking¶ in human beings were abhorrent and existing criminal laws were inadequate¶ to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, the U.S. Congress passed¶ and President William Jefferson Clinton signed into law the Trafficking¶ Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). By so doing, U.S. policymakers¶ recognized modern trafficking in persons as criminal behavior, subject to¶ specific sanctions under federal criminal law. The act sets out a threepronged¶ victim-centered approach to protect victims, prevent trafficking,¶ and prosecute traffickers. It was reauthorized, as required by the law, and¶ amended in 2003 and 2005.

\*\*Texas ev Begins\*\*

Laws, including criminal law, are not divine commandments, but products¶ of the policy-making process. Moreover, any legislation, in reality, is both¶ instrumental (tangible) and expressive (symbolic) (Chandler 1976: 4–6; Stolz¶ 1983: 162). Instrumental acts are those that are intended to produce some¶ effect, a means to an end (Chandler 1976: 4). U.S. legislation is typically¶ studied from the perspective of who gets what, when, and how (Dahl 1961;¶ Key 1964; Huitt & Peabody 1969; Truman 1951; Greenwald 1977). Such¶ research focuses on how interest groups use the policy-making process to¶ achieve a variety of tangible rewards. Political acts may also be viewed as¶ expressive acts, as symbols (Edelman 1964, 1971; Gusfield 1986). This does¶ not mean that these political acts are meaningless but that they are ends in¶ themselves. The symbolic politics framework usually focuses attention on¶ the general public as the audience toward which political acts are directed¶ and assumes that the audience’s perception of and/or reaction to the act is¶ more important than its substance (Edelman 1964: 38, 40; Gusfield 1986: 21).¶ Studies of criminal law and criminal justice policy identify various symbolic¶ functions, including reassuring or threatening the onlooker, educating about¶ a problem, simplifying the complex problem of crime, communicating a moral¶ educative message, and providing a model for the states (Marion 1997;¶ Stolz 1983, 1985, 1992, 1999, 2002).

#### Doesn’t solve – masculine militarism is too deeply entrenched

Landreau – their author – 11 John, associate professor of women's and gender studies at The College of New Jersey, “Fighting Words: Obama, Masculinity and the Rhetoric of National Security”, thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory and culture, Vol 10, No 1 (2011)

Obama's national security policies and rhetoric are, to be fair, significantly different in many ways than Bush's. Nonetheless, he steeps his rhetoric of hope for a new foreign policy in the old, familiar language of American exceptionalism. This illustrates how the political logic of a militarized and masculinized nation, presidency and citizenry has proved to be more enduring, significant and powerful than the strategy differences that have divided Democrats and Republicans over the last 60 years. It is important also because the cultural logic of American exceptionalism guaranteed by military power makes so many questions difficult to ask because the questions themselves seem absurd, effeminately nave, or simply out of rhetorical limits. These are unasked questions such as what violence was required to achieve our affluence and power? How can that violence be justified? Are there models for world peace, prosperity and freedom other than America's dominance and "leadership?" Does military power and violence produce security? What constitutes security? Is invulnerability a legitimate security goal? Is the authority of Commander-in-chief one that automatically adheres to the presidency at all times, or should the executive be more limited in its power as originally envisioned in the Constitution? Is citizenship best characterized in terms of a militarized and masculinized patriotism? Can terrorism be fought with large-scale military tactics? Of course, it is impossible to know all the ins and outs of how Obama and his advisors reached the decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. For those who voted for Obama over Clinton during the Democratic primary campaign because of his clear-spoken commitment to a different kind of foreign policy, the decision is disappointing to say the least. In the final analysis, when the decision was made, and its justification needed to be formulated into public rhetoric, what is clear is that the Obama administration felt at home in and oriented by - the old language of American exceptionalism. Familiar orientations, as Sara Ahmed argues, are an "effect of inhabitance." That is, their sense, their familiarity and their surety are products of their alignment with an already aligned world (7). My argument here is that the sense Obama makes of war is indebted to and made possible by - the familiarity and common-sense orientation of American exceptionalism. If the militarism and masculinism of his national security logic seem sensible or reassuring, it is because they are oriented in deeply familiar ways. The rhetoric of war and national security also works, of course, to recreate the familiar orientation from which it emerges. As Susan Jeffords argues, in the post-Vietnam context, heroic narratives about the war had the decisive (but indirectly manifested) effect of "remasculinizing American culture." This is why the work of disorientation that is proposed by feminist International Relations scholars and activists with its specific focus on the hidden injuries of gender in the familiar discourses of war and security is so important. It is also why it is so difficult. I have argued that Obama's war logic is oriented by, and serves to reorient us towards, a national mythology grounded in narratives of glorified violence and masculinity. The difficulty of challenging and disorienting that prevailing narrative is eloquently described by Jorge Luis Borges in his story "The South." The story serves as an apt allegory of the mythology of American exceptionalism with its multiple commitments to masculinity and violence, and for the ways this mythology works to make military violence the seemingly inevitable and sensible locus where the national story is both resolved and reinvigorated. The main character in "The South" is named Juan Dahlmann. Dahlmann feels "deeply Argentine" despite the fact that his paternal grandfather was a northern European immigrant. Dahlmann's patriotic sense of identity involves, among other things, having purchased a little ranch in the south that had once been in his mother's family. Dahlmann lives in Buenos Aires, and for him the south has tremendous symbolic resonance as that place that retains the masculinist features of national mythology: the pampa, the gaucho, the singing bard, the tavern, the duel. Dahlmann dreams about the ranch and its old house, and takes comfort in imagining it waiting for him on the pampa, even though he never really gets a chance to actually go there. One day, Dahlmann is struck gravely ill with a terrible infection and is hospitalized with high fever. As is typical of so many of Borges' stories, it is impossible to tell if the subsequent narrated events are products of his hallucinatory state or are really happening to him. In any event, after some days of medical intervention, he is released and boards a train towards the south to convalesce at his ranch. He arrives, enters a tavern where he eats barbeque and drinks wine, and then is taunted by some young men who have been drinking too much. Although the bar owner tells him to pay them no mind, Dahlmann confronts them as any traditional male character in a gaucho story would be required to do. In seeming recognition of his decisive entrance into one of the enduring storylines of nationalist mythology (the knife fight between men at a watering hole on the pampa), the ancient gaucho in the corner of the bar who until now has remained motionless as if frozen in time, becomes "ecstatic" and throws him a dagger. The rest is preordained: Dahlmann will walk out of the tavern with a knife in his hand, he will fight bravely, and then die with the stranger's blade in his gut. It is, the narrator says, "as if the South had decided that Dahlmann should agree to the duel." (203) When he picks up the dagger, he feels two things: first, "that this almost instinctive act committed him to fighting" and, second, "that, in his clumsy hand, the weapon would not serve to defend him, but rather to justify their killing of him" (Borges, 203 translations mine). For me, "The South" is a story about the masculinist mythology of national identity and violence. Intricate and contradictory is it dream or reality? the myth exercises its force both from within on Dahlmann's imagination and from without on his body. The logic of a militarized and masculinized rhetoric of national security, in concert with the economic logic of our military budget and the imperial logic of our global ambition, serves as our "south" leading us onward towards the use of large-scale military violence as if in a dream from which we cannot wake. We cannot hear the warnings of the barkeep who tries to tell us that we do not have to kill or be killed in this instance. Like Dahlmann, our politicians, even the less bellicose among them when faced with security threats simply cannot imagine any alternative to masculinist bravado and the duel to the death.

#### Congressional symbolic politics fails – Tea Party shuts down the debate

Nader, 13 – Ralph, JD Harvard Law School, A.B. magna cum laude @ the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, activist. “Tea Party Energy vs. Progressive Lassitude in Congress,” October 9, http://nader.org/2013/10/09/tea-party-energy-vs-progressive-lassitude-congress/

The difference between the sheer energy levels of the far Right and the progressive Left in Congress is stunning. There is no comparison. The extreme Right know who they are: bulls. Their pathway to public recognition comes by defying the Republican Party leadership, thereby securing major media attention. This helps these extremists advance their minority-supported goals of privileges for the few at the expense of the many. Progressive Left activists, on the other hand, make good speeches and statements but generally defer to their Party leaders who are largely out of gas, except when it comes to raising money from commercial interests. Let’s go to the specifics and proper names. Whatever your opinions may be, it is hard to argue that Senator Ted Cruz, Senator Rand Paul, Senator Mike Lee, Representative Justin Amash and about 35 other Tea Party fighters aren’t getting the daily attention of the mass media and setting the agenda for their Congressional leaders. Republican Representative Amash even managed to get both House Republicans and Democrats within a whisker of properly stopping some of the NSA’s blanket snooping on Americans in July. The high-energy extreme Right-wing in Congress can nullify the effects of overwhelming public sentiment on many matters that benefit the American people. Where is the pushback by the fifty single-payer (full Medicare for everyone) supporters in Congress as represented by H.R.676 and supported by a majority of the American people, physicians and nurses? Nowhere. The Congressional drums are being beaten against Obamacare. Both Right and Left believe, for different reasons, that Obamacare is seriously flawed. But the progressives have left this best alternative on the shelf. Where is the progressive Left’s political energy in Congress behind raising the federal minimum wage? Thirty million workers are making less today than workers made in 1968, adjusted for inflation. Had the minimum wage kept pace with inflation over these forty-five years, it would be $10.56 per hour instead of the current federal minimum wage of $7.25. A few members of Congress have put their modest bills in the hopper, but not on the Table. Meanwhile, the far Right opponents can focus their energies on their agenda, unworried that the progressive-Left activists are even going to seriously bestir themselves on what should be a signature issue for them. After much exhortation by worker-allied groups, Senator Tom Harkin and Representative George Miller introduced legislation to raise the federal minimum wage to $10.10 over three years. Remember over 70 percent of the American people support such an increase. Even Republican Rick Santorum, the 2012 presidential candidate, supports raising the minimum wage. Speaking with the Democrats’ leader in the House, Nancy Pelosi, earlier this year at a social gathering, I raised the need to “catch up with 1968” for thirty million American workers. “That’s a good thing,” she said, smiling and moving to the next series of handshakes. Apparently, not enough of a “good thing” for the comfortable veteran Democrats, with their secure Congressional seats, to aggressively champion the cause of thousands of workers picketing fast food chains, Walmart and federal contractors who pay low wages, while many of their CEOs make millions of dollars a year. Dozens of non-profit advocacy groups and social service associations for the poor, whose members lean heavily Democratic, want an increase in the minimum wage to meet the necessities of life. Even that support, with majority poll-backing, is not enough to get progressive members of Congress to go ‘hell-bent for leather’ like the Tea Partiers. The self-styled progressive Democrats actually outnumber the self-described Tea Partiers in the Congress. But the latter vastly outhustle their opponents and pressure their own leadership either to go along or be neutral. Great majoritarian issues such as cracking down on corporate crime, ending tax havens for corporations and the rich, creating public works programs with good paying jobs, pulling back on the Empire abroad, and rejecting corporate welfare and bailouts cannot seem to arouse what is left of the Left in Congress. Sure, here and there these lawmakers are on the record. But they’re not on the ramparts. The mocking Tea Partiers, along with the corporate opponents of these reforms, know the difference. Even the best of the Left, legislators such as Senators Bernie Sanders and Sherrod Brown, seem unable to vigorously network their like-minded colleagues and allied citizen groups and rev up the horsepower behind their beliefs. At best, with few exceptions, they are Lone Rangers. Long-time Congressman, now Senator, Edward Markey has taken many a leading stand warning about climate change and the Greenhouse effect on the planet. Yet when Republican Senator James Inhofe, who has called climate change a “hoax,” agreed to debate the then-Congressman Markey, Mr. Markey said he too was willing to debate but then found every scheduling excuse he could to avoid the debate over a period of 18 months! The willing sponsor, Politico, was kept waiting to no avail. Legislators like Senator Markey are losing the public opinion battle over taking hold of the climate change issue, notwithstanding the issuance of more reports that more extensively confirm the science and point to the already damaging effects on the polar ice caps and the acidification of the Oceans. Citizen groups are frustrated that their allies on Capitol Hill are continually defeatist and unwilling to shake the place up as the Tea Partiers have been doing even as their financiers in the big business community have become appalled by the Tea Party’s leveraged partial government shutdown and its curled lip against the upcoming debt ceiling crisis. Progressive words must never mask the absence of progressive action in Congress. The people deserve better than progressive sinecurists in Congress who are so smug that they increasingly do not return calls from civic leaders who press them to move out of their comfort zones and from words to deeds. Many can learn from the very few determined, energetic exceptions within their ranks like the wave-making Congressman Alan Grayson from Florida.

#### Reframing around gender fails – public apathy and confusion

Aravosis, 13 – John, Editor of AMERICAblog, JD/Masters in Foreign Service from Georgetown, “Why women’s rights are moving backwards as gay rights advance,” AMERICABlog, April 8, <http://americablog.com/2013/04/why-gay-rights-success-and-women-not.html>.

I was asked asked by someone on Twitter this weekend why the fight for gay rights we doing so well of late, especially when some other progressive movements, like women’s rights, seemed to be moving backwards. Do u think part of the reason gay rights has moved forward while women’s rights backwards is b/c gay rights includes men’s rights? It’s an interesting question, and a difficult one, because it takes a good understand of both question: Why gay rights have done so well; and why women’s right haven’t? I know a lot about the former, and while I worked on women’s issue for a number of years consulting with Planned Parenthood, I don’t know them as deeply as I know gay rights. Still, it’s a point worth considering. First, as for the gender issue, it’s hard to say. The conventional wisdom in gay politics has always been that lesbians were the kinder and gentler face of the movement. That straight men aren’t threatened by lesbians (and even, crudely, find lesbians “hot”). Whereas they hate gay men, are threatened by gay men, etc. And gay men represent the sexualized component of our movement, in part because gay men got AIDS, whereas lesbians didn’t in as great of numbers, and the religious right and their GOP allies were happy to use AIDS against us. So it’s not clear that the presence of gay men made the gay movement more sympathetic-seeming to the outside, but still, it’s an interesting argument. It’s not just women, the left hasn’t done terribly well the last 12 years In reality, the issue, and the problem, seems to go far beyond women’s rights. Ever since September 11, a lot of progressive issues haven’t done terribly well. Women’s issues, to be sure, but on the environment and gun control things have generally been stagnant legislatively and moving backwards in the polls (up until Sandy Hook changed things on the gun issue, though possibly only temporarily). Chris handles Wall Street reform for us, and I’m sure he’ll tell you that not nearly enough has happened on that issue, even after the world almost ended in September of 2008. On health care reform, we eeked out a victory by the skin of our teeth, and it still wasn’t the extent of victory we should have had considering the forces lined up against the Republicans (and conservative Dems) right after the 2008 election. On immigration, things are only improving after 1) the immigration movement adopted the in-your-face tactics of gay activists; and 2) the GOP freaked out about the Latino vote after the 2012 elections. Democrats are bad at PR, gays less so Having said that, the Democrats are in control of the White House and the Senate, so it’s not like America has turned against Democrats and our ideas. The problem is something else. I’ve often chalked it up, in part at least, to a lack of political marketing know-how, or even an appreciation of the need for political marketing, among Democrats. Democrats often don’t know how to fight, at least in the policy realm (for elections, oddly, they tend to do better). So we don’t win nearly as much as we should, and could, because the people fighting for our ideas don’t do it very well. On gay rights, the most innovative, and some of the most influential, work in the past few years came from non-standard players. You had the gay Netroots, Get Equal, Dan Choi and a number of ticked off current and former servicemembers, which included upstart groups like OutServe and Servicemembers United, and some mainstream groups like SLDN. And all of them were effective because they were willing to exert more pressure than is polite on the administration, and Congress. Now, it’s an interesting question as to whether gender played a role here, going back to the question I was asked on Twitter, about whether the presence of men in the gay movement made a difference. I have been told by a number of women that men tend to practice politics, and talk about politics, differently than women, in part because women face far more, and nastier, vitriol than men when they get involved in politics in the first place. It’s an interesting question as to whether an activist group that inclues men acts differently, comes up with different strategies and tactics, and challenges power more than a group made up exclusively of women (put another way, were gay advocates willing to be nastier, and less worried about blowback, because many of the activists were men?). I’m not entirely sure. GetEqual, for example, was run by a fierce woman, my friend Robin McGehee. But gender, per se, defines the women’s movement in a way that it doesn’t define other progressive movements, so it’s a question worth asking. It would be interesting to hear from more women as to whether they think a group of women might act differently, in a political context, strategically and tactically, than a group of men and women, or just men. Back to the independent gay activists I mentioned above, it should be noted that those players didn’t act in a vacuum. There were other mainstream groups that will say they were influential, and one hopes they were, and the times were a-changin’, and that didn’t hurt either. As gay people continued to come out to family, friends and coworkers, and as Hollywood and the media increasingly portrayed gay people as human beings, the religious right caricature (lie) of a gay person couldn’t stand against the reality of the truth. Gays have the “advantage” of being further behind women, which makes our message clearer To some degree, I feel that asking why gay rights is proceeding and issue X isn’t is a bit like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Yes, there were a number of media-savvy, fearless, advocates who were critical to advancing our cause, especially online the past 15 or so years. But perhaps the gay rights battle did well because we lacked the subtlety of the women’s rights cause. What I mean by that is that the religious right invested an awful lot of time and money into portraying gay people as something we weren’t. As that false image started to shatter, so did the prejudice long upheld by that falsity. Do women face the same demonization? Maybe, but I don’t think the public perceives it the same. I think today’s gay rights movement is more akin to the fight for women’s suffrage – a clear discriminatory harm that made it easier to rally against, and eventually easier to poke holes in, than the current battles facing women. I’m not saying suffrage was easy – I’m saying that as an organizer, a political operative, the battle lines were clearer, and the issue easier to sell, in my view, than the problems women face today. Women’s advocates, in many ways, are fighting a war of nuance. Where gays want to get married, women don’t want the right to choose, which varies by trimester, cut back any further by a seemingly-endless series of small, but significant, legislative advances by anti-choice forces that slowly but surely whittle away at the right to choose. The gay battle lines, and message, are much clearer, and thus an easier sell, I think. Are women a victim of their own success? In many ways, the women’s rights movement is a victim of its own success. As a man, it’s not as easy to see where women are still lacking in rights (that doesn’t mean they aren’t, I’m saying that clarity of the harm isn’t as stark as perhaps it once was). On gay rights, there are hate crimes that shock the sensibilities. There were decorated gay servicemembers losing their livelihood simply because of who they were. And there were loving gay couples who just wanted the chance to settle down like everyone else. It was easy for us as advocates to define the rights we didn’t have. From a man’s perspective, you see women getting the same jobs as man as never before. Women are corporate CEOs, doctors and pilots and lawyers and astronauts (something noteworthy if you’re in your 40s or older and lived through a time when women simply didn’t hold those jobs), and they even become Speaker of the House, and might even become President in 2016. And, for all appearance, Roe v Wade is still the law of the land, so it’s understandable that some might scratch their heads and ask, what are pro-choicers complaining about? They’re complaining because in the 40 years since Roe the religious right and the Republican party have so whittled away at Roe as to make it meaningless, according to some lead women’s advocates. And, even though women now hold many of the same jobs as men, they don’t always get the same pay. But that takes some complicated explaining, and it contradicts what the public might consider an obvious “truth,” that Roe hasn’t been overturned, so how can it be in danger, or nearly already gone, and women “have the same jobs as men,” so what’s the problem? And in many ways, African-Americans face the same problem as women. It’s easy for people to say “slavery ended 150 years ago, and the Civil Rights Act passed 50 years ago, so the African-American struggle is over,” without realizing that, for example, some schools in the south still hold segregated proms. People see African-American CEOs, doctors, lawyers, astronauts, and might think “they’ve won, employment discrimination over,” without understanding that, in some ways, it may never be over, at least not for a very long time. But the devil is in the details much more so than it is with gay rights because we’re still fighting for some of the rights that African-Americans got (at least on paper) fifty years ago. It makes our cause, I think, easier to explain. It also means that once we get many of our basic civil rights, gays may have the same difficulty fine-tuning those rights once people already think we have them. Voters don’t do nuance In a nutshell, people don’t do nuance. If you have to explain too many details, the public’s eyes glaze over. And on gay rights, in part because a lot of us are good at messaging, and in part because our message itself, the harm itself, is rather clear-cut, we’ve had more success than many on the left in the past decade. But it’s not just that. I’ve written a lot about how much of the professional left, as some like to call it, rolled over and played dead the past 12 years. And I think a lot of professional gay rights did too, to a degree. But our activists didn’t. Which actually raises another issue, AIDS. Nothing galvanizes a community, and inspires activists, like widespread death and political inaction. That’s an essay in and of itself. So I do think that each community has its own unique problems that it faces in selling its message. But I also think that a big part of the problem is what I called “political marketing,” or public relations. Aka, knowing how to sell your product (and knowing the value of knowing). The gays are particularly good at it. Other lefties in the past ten years, less so. And the one group that watched our success, and tried to learn from it and emulate it – immigration reform advocates – are now having success of their own, not just because they copied our model, but it helped. So that’s a modest beginning at trying to explain what the heck happened that made gay rights one of the shining successes of progressivism this past decade.

### Solvency

#### obama circuvments the justifications

#### 1-different tech

#### A. cruise missiles

Byman 13 (Daniel L. Byman Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy¶ Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)

But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force

#### b. Drones

**Singh & Wittes 12** (Ritika Singh – Research Assistant, Governance Studies, AND Benjamin Wittes – Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity”, Jan 11, The Cato Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/11-drones-wittes>, CMR)

Indeed, Cortright may argue that “terrorism is more a political and law enforcement challenge than a threat that can be addressed by military means,” but it is worth remembering that the opposite of targeted killing is not usually law enforcement. It is often less-targeted—that is, more indiscriminate—killing. The important flip side to Cortright’s anxiety that drones will lower our inhibition to go to war is that drones can also limit the scope and scale of military action. The United States is not going to take a hands-off approach to states like Pakistan and Yemen, where law enforcement is not a feasible option. Drone warfare permits a highly calibrated military response to situations in which the alternative may involve not lesser but far greater uses of military violence. This is a good trade. Conversely, drones also allow militaries to contemplate certain humanitarian interventions where they might never contemplate risking actual forces; consider whether the recent NATO Libyan intervention—which probably saved a considerable number of lives—would have been politically possible had U.S. forces been seriously at risk.¶ In other words, while the rise of drone warfare has changed the face of American counterterrorism efforts and promises far greater change in years to come, this does not present the simple and terrible moral equation that Cortright describes. What began as a surveillance tool that could, on occasion, deliver lethal force, has evolved in a short space of time into a principal means of following enemy forces onto territory in which the United States is reluctant to put large numbers of boots on the ground—and striking at them there in a limited fashion that protects innocent civilians to an unprecedented level.¶ The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.

#### 2- obama will say we aren’t in “hostilities”- foundational understanding

Koh, ’11 – Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor @ US State Department, “Libya and War Powers,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28, 2011, http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm

In this case, leaders of the current Congress have stressed this very concern in indicating that they do not believe that U.S. military operations in Libya amount to the kind of “hostilities” envisioned by the War Powers Resolution‟s 60-day pullout provision.8 The historical practice supports this view. In 1975, Congress expressly invited the Executive Branch to provide its best understanding of the term “hostilities.” My predecessor Monroe Leigh and Defense Department General Counsel Martin Hoffmann responded that, as a general matter, the Executive Branch understands the term “to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.” 9 On the other hand, as Leigh and Hoffmann suggested, the term should not necessarily be read to include situations where the nature of the mission is limited (i.e., situations that do not “involve the full military engagements with which the Resolution is primarily concerned” 10); where the exposure of U.S. forces is limited (e.g., situations involving “sporadic military or paramilitary attacks on our armed forces stationed abroad,” in which the overall threat faced by our military is low11); and where the risk of escalation is therefore limited. Subsequently, the Executive Branch has reiterated the distinction between full military encounters and more constrained operations, stating that “intermittent military engagements” do not require withdrawal of forces under the Resolution‟s 60-day rule. 12 In the thirty-six years since Leigh and Hoffmann provided their analysis, the Executive Branch has repeatedly articulated and applied these foundational understandings. The President was thus operating within this longstanding tradition of Executive Branch interpretation when he relied on these understandings in his legal explanation to Congress on June 15, 2011 First, the mission is limited: By Presidential design, U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a NATO-led multinational civilian protection operation, which is implementing a U.N. Security Council Resolution tailored to that limited purpose. This is a very unusual set of circumstances, not found in any of the historic situations in which the “hostilities” question was previously debated, from the deployment of U.S. armed forces to Lebanon, Grenada, and El Salvador in the early 1980s, to the fighting with Iran in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, to the use of ground troops in Somalia in 1993. Of course, NATO forces as a whole are more deeply engaged in Libya than are U.S. forces, but the War Powers Resolution‟s 60-day pullout provision was designed to address the activities of the latter.13¶ Second, the exposure of our armed forces is limited: To date, our operations have not involved U.S. casualties or a threat of significant U.S. casualties. Nor do our current operations involve active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, and members of our military have not been involved in significant armed confrontations or sustained confrontations of any kind with hostile forces.14 Prior administrations have not found the 60-day rule to apply even in situations where significant fighting plainly did occur, as in Lebanon and Grenada in 1983 and Somalia in 1993.15 By highlighting this point, we in no way advocate a legal theory that is indifferent to the loss of non-American lives. But here, there can be little doubt that the greatest threat to Libyan civilians comes not from NATO or the United States military, but from Qadhafi. The Congress that adopted the War Powers Resolution was principally concerned with the safety of U.S. forces,16 and with the risk that the President would entangle them in an overseas conflict from which they could not readily be extricated. In this instance, the absence of U.S. ground troops, among other features of the Libya operation, significantly reduces both the risk to U.S. forces and the likelihood of a protracted entanglement that Congress may find itself practically powerless to end.17¶ Third, the risk of escalation is limited: U.S. military operations have not involved the presence of U.S. ground troops, or any significant chance of escalation into a broader conflict characterized by a large U.S. ground presence, major casualties, sustained active combat, or expanding geographical scope. Contrast this with the 1991 Desert Storm operation, which although also authorized by a United Nations Security Council Resolution, presented “over 400,000 [U.S.] troops in the area—the same order of magnitude as Vietnam at its peak—together with concomitant numbers of ships, planes, and tanks.”18 Prior administrations have found an absence of “hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution in situations ranging from Lebanon to Central America to Somalia to the Persian Gulf tanker controversy, although members of the United States Armed Forces were repeatedly engaged by the other side‟s forces and sustained casualties in volatile geopolitical circumstances, in some cases running a greater risk of possible escalation than here.19¶ Fourth and finally, the military means we are using are limited: This situation does not present the kind of “full military engagement[] with which the [War Powers] Resolution is primarily concerned.”20 The violence that U.S. armed forces have directly inflicted or facilitated after the handoff to NATO has been modest in terms of its frequency, intensity, and severity. The air-to-ground strikes conducted by the United States in Libya are a far cry from the bombing campaign waged in Kosovo in 1999, which involved much more extensive and aggressive aerial strike operations led by U.S. armed forces.21 The U.S. contribution to NATO is likewise far smaller than it was in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, where U.S. forces contributed the vast majority of aircraft and air strike sorties to an operation that lasted over two and a half years, featured repeated violations of the no-fly zone and episodic firefights with Serb aircraft and gunners, and paved the way for approximately 20,000 U.S. ground troops.22 Here, by contrast, the bulk of U.S. contributions to the NATO effort has been providing intelligence capabilities and refueling assets. A very significant majority of the overall sorties are being flown by our coalition partners, and the overwhelming majority of strike sorties are being flown by our partners. American strikes have been confined, on an as-needed basis, to the suppression of enemy air defenses to enforce the no-fly zone, and to limited strikes by Predator unmanned aerial vehicles against discrete targets in support of the civilian protection mission; since the handoff to NATO, the total number of U.S. munitions dropped has been a tiny fraction of the number dropped in Kosovo. All NATO targets, moreover, have been clearly linked to the Qadhafi regime‟s systematic attacks on the Libyan population and populated areas, with target sets engaged only when strictly necessary and with maximal precision.¶ Had any of these elements been absent in Libya, or present in different degrees, a different legal conclusion might have been drawn. But the unusual confluence of these four factors, in an operation that was expressly designed to be limited—limited in mission, exposure of U.S. troops, risk of escalation, and military means employed—led the President to conclude that the Libya operation did not fall within the War Powers Resolution‟s automatic 60-day pullout rule.

#### 2-- obama will ignore the aff --empirics prove humanitarian restrictions impossible to enforce

Hildebrandt et al. ’13 (Timothy Hildebrandt, Assistant Professor in Social Policy and Developoment in the Department of Social Policy at The London School of Economics, Courtney Hillebrecht, Ph.d., Assistant Professor in IR @ the University of Nebraska Lincoln, and Jon Pevehouse, “Opinion: In U.S., humanitarian intervention is just 'politics as usual,'” <http://www.ibsys.com/content-development/content-portfolio/Opinion-In-U-S-humanitarian-intervention-is-just-politics-as-usual/-/8622374/20140962/-/s6jhd2z/-/index.html>)

Those who push for more humanitarian missions can increase support for such missions by raising public outcry for action.¶ But the bad news is that humanitarian crises, like in Syria, which should rise above politics as usual, are often mired in that very spot.¶ Although public opinion appears to have an influence on legislative behavior, traditional factors such as partisanship have the strongest influence on how legislators cast their votes.¶ Humanitarian intervention is most likely when the U.S. president enjoys a majority in Congress. In the case of the 1990s, humanitarian interventions failed to get off the ground when President Clinton lost majorities in Congress.¶ If American politics is becoming increasingly partisan, future administrations should have an even harder time galvanizing the domestic support they need to address any humanitarian crises.¶ This does not mean, however, that humanitarian intervention will only occur when a president enjoys a majority in Congress. As the recently launched humanitarian missions suggest, politicians are learning the lessons of the 1990s and circumventing Congress.¶ This helps explain why President Obama's decision to contribute the U.S. military to NATO operations in Libya proceeded without Congressional authorization; the president was surely aware that such a vote would go down to defeat in a Republican-controlled House and deeply partisan Senate.¶ Congress was similarly bypassed in October 2011 when the administration deployed military advisers to Uganda.¶ Congress was similarly bypassed in 2011 and 2013 when the administration deployed military advisers to Uganda and Jordan, respectively.

#### circumvention turns the entire aff- presumption is a real option

Stolz 7 Their Author (Barbara, political scientist / criminologist, July, “Interpreting the U.S. Human Trafficking Debate Through the Lens of Symbolic Politics.”, Law and Policy, 2007, Vol. 29 Issue , p311-338 st)

VI. CONCLUSION¶ As any legislation, TVPA is, in reality, both instrumental (tangible) and¶ expressive (symbolic). This article has examined TVPA from the perspective of¶ symbolic politics and criminal justice policy. Applying a symbolic framework¶ to the policymaking processes that led to U.S. trafficking in persons’ legislation¶ sheds light on both the trafficking debate and the use of criminal law in¶ society. The analysis allows for a further elaboration of the symbolic framework¶ and has implications for the study of U.S. trafficking in persons’ policymaking,¶ specifically, and U.S. criminal justice policymaking, generally.¶ The case study of TVPA demonstrated that the symbolic functions of¶ legislation may be directed toward more than one audience, not just the¶ general public or mass movements. In this instance, the other audiences¶ included victims, lawbreakers, members of Congress, states, and interest¶ groups. These audiences were reassured or threatened, educated about the¶ problem, and sent messages about the line between right and wrong; however,¶ not all the audiences can be described as responding to symbols that were¶ oversimplified or stereotyped. Members of Congress and interest group¶ leaders, for example, tended to be more sophisticated audiences, requiring the¶ implementation of the legislation, not just its enactment, to be reassured.¶ In addition, the analysis of TVPA suggests a more complex interaction¶ between audience and symbol and between symbol manipulators and¶ diverse audiences. Members of Congress or the leadership of interest groups¶ may at the same time be audience and manipulators of symbols, as suggested¶ by the discussion of the educative function and the development of TVPA.¶ Moreover, the symbol manipulators may seek to send a message simultaneously¶ to diverse audiences, as illustrated by the inclusion of the two-tier¶ definition of trafficking in persons in TVPA.¶ The article also points out that the policy debate over how to address¶ the problem of trafficking in persons is not simply a debate between those¶ who wish to abolish and those who would legalize or regulate prostitution.¶ Rather, the debate is between those organizations that focus primarily, if¶ not exclusively, on sex trafficking and usually seek to link or conflate sex¶ trafficking with prostitution—“the antiprostitution sphere”—and those¶ organizations that focus on trafficking as a crime in and of itself and¶ define it to encompass any unfree labor—“the human trafficking sphere.”¶ Understanding the debate in its complexity allows for a more sophisticated¶ examination of TVPA and its provisions. For example, the analysis of the¶ moral educative function demonstrates how the simplification of the issue¶ to a debate over public policy on prostitution has been used to condemn¶ and vilify opponents, making it difficult to achieve compromise. Moreover,¶ the law itself addresses more than U.S. policy on prostitution; rather, it¶ provides a response to a complex conceptualization of trafficking in¶ persons, which includes a range of behaviors. These observations suggest¶ that researchers need to look beyond the rhetoric of a policy debate so as¶ not to fall victim to oversimplification found therein.¶ A vital consideration in the development and implementation of criminal¶ law is that the law be enforceable. Being asked to enforce unenforceable¶ laws is frustrating for law enforcement. Such laws, while in the short run¶ may send a reassurance message to the general public, in the long run may¶ not only not reassure but also undermine public confidence in the law and¶ the legal system’s ability to combat the problem. Recognizing the difficulty,¶ if not impossibility, of achieving compromise between the two spheres of¶ interest groups on some aspects of trafficking and provisions in the law,¶ policymakers should consider the following steps in order to assure the¶ development and implementation of effective policy and enforceable law:

### Framing

#### the disad isn’t linear causality- it’s sceanrio planning

Steven Bernstein 2k et al., “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World,” EJIR, 6, 43, 2000, p. 53-55

One useful alternative approach is the development of scenarios, or narratives with plot lines that map a set of causes and trends in future time. This forward reasoning strategy is based on a notion of contingent causal mechanisms, in opposition to the standard, neo-positivist focus on efficient causes, but with no clear parallel in evolutionary biology. It should not be confused with efforts by some to develop social scientific concepts directly analogous to evolutionary mechanisms (such as variation or selection) in biology to explain, for example, transformations in the international system or institutions, or conditions for optimum performance in the international political economy. Scenarios are not predictions; rather, they start with the assumption that the future is unpredictable and tell alternative stories of how the future may unfold. Scenarios are generally constructed by distinguishing what we believe is relatively certain from what we think is uncertain. The most important ‘’certainties’ are common to all scenarios that address the problem or trend, while the most important perceived uncertainties differentiate one scenario from another. The approach differs significantly from a forecasting tournament or competition, where advocates of different theoretical perspectives generate differential perspectives on a single outcome in the hope of subsequently identifying the ‘best’ or most accurate performer. Rather, by constructing scenarios, or plausible stories of paths to the future, we can identify the different driving forces (a term we prefer to independent variable, since it implies a force pushing in a certain direction rather than what is known on one side of an ‘equals’ sign) and then attempt to combine these forces in logical chains that generate a range of outcomes, rather than single futures. Scenarios make contingent claims rather than point predictions. They reinsert a sensible notion of contingency into theoretical arguments that would otherwise tend toward determinism. Scholars in international relations tend to privilege arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. The field also favors variables that are structural or otherwise parametric, thus downplaying the role of both agency and accident. Forward reasoning undercuts structural determinism by raising the possibility and plausibility of multiple futures. Scenarios are impressionistic pictures that build on different combinations of causal variables that may also take on different values in different scenarios. Thus it is possible to construct scenarios without pre-existing firm proof of theoretical claims that meet strict positivist standards. The foundation for scenarios is made up of provisional assumptions and causal claims. These become the subject of revision and updating more than testing. A set of scenarios often contains competing or at least contrasting assumptions. It is less important where people start, than it is where they end up through frequent revisions, and how they got there. A good scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis about how the future might unfold; it is a chain of logic that connects ‘drivers’ to outcomes (Rosell, 1999:126). Consider as an example one plausible scenario at the level of a ‘global future’ where power continues to shift away from the state and towards international institutions, transnational actors and local communities. The state lose its monopoly on the provision of security and basic characteristics of the Westphalian system as we have known it are fundamentally altered. In this setting, key decisions about security, economics and culture will be made by non-state actors. Security may become a commodity that can be bought like other commodities in the global marketplace. A detailed scenario about this transformation would specify the range of changes that are expected to occur and how they are connected to one another. It would also identify what kinds of evidence might support the scenario as these or other processes unfold over the next decade, and what kind of evidence would count against the scenario. This is simply a form of process tracing, or increasing the number of observable implications of an argument, in future rather than past time. Eventually, as in the heuristics of evolutionary biology, future history becomes data. But instead of thinking of data as something that can falsify any particular hypothesis, one should think of it as something capable of distinguishing or selecting the story that was from the stories that might have been.

#### Predictions work

**Chernoff 09** [Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage]

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, HeikkiPatomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism.First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw [person] man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 Thereflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

## 2NC

### HJ Good: O/V 2NC

#### Kosovo proves - deescalates or stops war from happening in the first place- allows leaders to make politically difficult concessions

By Ryan Goodman 6 \* ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf

\*\*NOTE: UHI=Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Two conflicts-the Kosovo intervention and the recent Iraq war-will help to illustrate these claims. The above discussion analyzes consequences that may ensue when a revisionist state proffers foreign human rights violations as a casus belli. The Kosovo and Iraq conflicts each involved such framing efforts by revisionist states. Both cases therefore potentially illuminate some of the consequences that could ensue were states (legally) encouraged to set forth a humanitarian justification for using force in other disputes. Consider first the Kosovo intervention. Although not a perfect fit, the conflict illustrates the opportunities for face-saving settlements in a multi-issue dispute. More specifically, the case indicates how a humanitarian rationale can prevent all-out war or deescalate an existing con- flict. As I discuss shortly, having proffered a humanitarian justification for initiating force, NATO leaders were able to make politically difficult concessions and deescalate the conflict before it turned into full-scale, ground warfare. The Kosovo conflict thus showcases some of the mechanisms whereby humanitarian justifications could serve the interests of peace at these and other stages in a dispute The use of force by NATO led "only to a limited military intervention,"140 and the conflict deescalated once NATO (and Milosevic) found political space to make significant concessions. The intervention served multiple interests: securing regional stability, maintaining the cred- ibility of NATO, and protecting human rights.141 Notably, some commentators doubt whether the last of these rationales genuinely motivated NATO's actions.142 We need not resolve that particular question here. It is worth noting, however, that if the official human- itarian justifications were disingenuous, the Kosovo intervention would serve our analytic pur- poses even better. Regardless of which motivations actually inspired them to act, when gov- ernment leaders made the commitment to use force, they expected that Milosevic would quickly capitulate.143 Once the conflict was under way, however, member states became increasingly concerned that NATO would have to escalate to ground warfare in order to obtain the concessions initially demanded ofMilosevic.144 Indeed, President Clinton and other lead- ers- especially in Germany and Italy-were reportedly searching for an opportunity to claim success and bring the conflict to an end. 145 NATO ultimately obtained guarantees from Milos- evic for the protection of Kosovo Albanians but compromised on other significant demands. Political leaders secured an imperfect peace and claimed victory. Notably, some close observers of the conflict argued that NATO had abandoned some of the main objectives of the intervention.146 Champions of the intervention pointed to the achievements gained and the relatively low number of battle-related deaths.147 In short, the availability of a humanitarian rationale allowed NATO leaders, in Huth's terms, "to packag[e] a politically viable agreement" and "counter charges of appeasement and capitulation" while retreating from a major military commitment and terminating the conflict.148 In other words, NATO leaders could "claim that [Milosevic's] concessions on certain issues were a major gain," thereby "fend[ing] off domestic or foreign political adversaries who claim[ed] that the government of the would-be attacker state[s] ... retreated under pressure."'49 As a more general lesson, these events indicate how a humanitarian justification in a multi-issue dispute can facilitate opportunities for leaders to bail out of militarized disputes that they do not want to escalate.

#### iraq proves- security justifications caused it- HJ would have prevented it

By Ryan Goodman 6 \* ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf

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Leaders will not always seek opportunities to avert escalation, as the UK and U.S. actions in the recent Iraq war demonstrate. The question is, then, whether the Iraq conflict is a coun- terexample to the preceding analysis. In that case the U.S. government included humanitarian intervention as one of the potential grounds for invading Iraq, and the conflict nonetheless ended in war. A single contradictory (or consistent) case would not, of course, either repudiate or confirm an analysis of aggregate tendencies of state behavior.'50 Nevertheless, it is helpful to examine the Iraq conflict as a salient case of a humanitarian justification used to promote war. As the following discussion demonstrates, the Iraq conflict does not serve as a counter- example; the case is, instead, consistent with points made above. The Iraq conflict illustrates, in particular, the importance of the politics of justification and the ineffectiveness of an implau- sible humanitarian rationale. The political process leading up to the Iraq war shows the importance of justificatory strat- egies. Borrowing from Snyder's analysis of strategic myths, Chaim Kaufmann's case study of the war examines the theoretical significance of various rationales that the Bush administration promulgated for invading Iraq.15 Most importantly, the administration framed the conflict away from the previously dominant justification (Saddam Hussein's threat to the region) to a new justification (Saddam Hussein's direct threat to the U.S. homeland and citizenry). The latter required a concerted strategy of depicting a threat that linked Hussein to transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).152 While the earlier framework created a political consensus favoring military containment, the subsequent framework mobilized sup- port for an attack.153 A useful supplement to Kaufmann's analysis might be that the post-9/1 1 context uniquely amplified the political effect of the more recent framework.154 Independent of 9/11, however, it was this general justificatory campaign- concentrating on Hussein's direct threat to U.S. security-that ultimately led to the war. The Iraq war may illustrate the significance of security-oriented MIDs that dated back to the 1990s. Had the United States spent the previous years framing those hostilities principally around humanitarian conditions inside Iraq rather than around Iraq's military threat to the region, it may have proven more difficult for the U.S. government to go to war in 2003. At the very least, the late invocation of humanitarian concerns as a justification for the 2003 Iraq war may have been less of a cause for the escalation of hostilities than were the MIDs in years prior. More significantly, the likelihood of war might have been lower had the legal regime encour- aged the United States to promulgate humanitarian objectives as the driving force for interstate hostilities during that earlier period. The Iraq conflict also demonstrates how a humanitarian pretext will fail- either to empower or to constrain leaders-if it is considered implausible. That is, a humanitarian ratio- nale can produce constraining (blowback) effects only if it creates the initial impression assumed by the pretext model: the justification must be both believed and accepted if it is to produce any meaningful social effects. As explained above,155 this point is straightforward. The political support that state R can achieve in employing a humanitarian pretext will depend on the plausibility of the justification. Plausibility turns, in significant part, on whether the facts of the case match the justificatory rationale. Half-heartedly using a humanitarian justification as a supplement to other reasons for war also undercuts the plausibility of the asserted human- itarian rationale. And if the rationale is unpersuasive, we should not expect its promotion to exert significant influence in building public support or, as a result, in constraining behavior through a blowback mechanism. The road to war will be determined on other grounds. The humanitarian rationale for invading Iraq was generally not believed or accepted. The human rights conditions in Iraq were conspicuously unlike previous cases in which human- itarian intervention was considered appropriate.156 Indeed, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz admitted that the administration "settled on the one issue that every- one could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason"-rather than "the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people," which he believed was by itself "not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk."'57 As Sean Murphy explains, the agreed "justification ... reflected a public rejection of the argument for a U.S. invasion based solely on humanitarian grounds." '58 Analyzing the rhetorical efforts preceding the war, Rodger Payne explains that the administration did not sell the war on the basis of a humanitarian justification but instead relied on national security threats.159 The administration's humanitarian rationale for the conflict came to the fore only after the military defeat of the Hussein regime and the realization that Iraq had no WMDs.

#### HJ displace realpolitk- that causes war

displaces realism- alt to humanitarian jsutifications is using realpolitik- that creates security dilemmas- insecurity, distrust, hostility- increases risk of war by empowering neocons---goodman

By Ryan Goodman 6 \* ¶ J. Sinclair Armstrong Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law ¶ School. “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR” THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 100:107] http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf

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Steps to War Wars are generally the product of an extended, dynamic process. William Dixon describes interstate conflict as a "dynamic process that unfolds through a series of stages."49 Much to the same effect, John Vasquez notes that "wars grow out of a long-term political relationship that has become increasingly intractable, conflictive, and hostile."50 Notably, even in the periods in which internationalaw permitted states wide latitude to wage war as an instrument of national policy-indeed, as a sovereign right-the general expectation was that recourse to war was an act of last resort.51 History is replete with examples of states undertaking efforts of justification and employing peaceful and coercive measures before initiating an armed attack.52 Even at the point that states begin developing war plans, the process can still be protracted. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider features of the general process and associated patterns of state behavior. We need to understand the conditions under which states progress from an initial stage of a diplomatic dispute to a militarized interstate dispute (MID)53 and then to the onset of war. In detailing this process, Vasquez coined an expression-the "steps to war"-to denote practices that states adopt in response to a dispute that can, regardless of intentions, increase the likelihood of war.54 For Vasquez, these steps include: elevating individuals who adhere to a "power politics" paradigm (realpolitik) to positions of greater governmental authority; engaging in arms buildups; and forging military alliances.55 He contends that these practices have the perverse effect of generating dangerous levels of insecurity, distrust, and hostility between adversaries. Whether Vasquez is correct about these particular practices is not relevant for the moment. Here, the key points are that the road to war generally involves a long-term process, and that changes in domestic political configurations and interstate relations can unin- tentionally accelerate the speed with which the process unfolds-and increase the likelihood that it will, in the end, lead to war. Understanding war in these terms has three implications for legalizing UHI. First, consid- ering war as the outcome of a process focuses attention on political interactions during that process and on the sequence of events.56 Depending on when it occurs, the invocation of humanitarian justifications can shape both how actors respond to the conflict and subsequent steps to war. For example, actions taken in the name of humanitarianism may affect which expert groups are empowered within governmental circles and which collective beliefs about the situation develop in the course of the conflict. Second, examining the onset of war as a process helps to illuminate not only the theoretical significance of relatively discrete stages in the process, but potential transitions between those stages.57 Most important in this respect are MIDs- conditions of tension between states that involve a threat to use force, a show of force, or the limited use of force.58 In considering humanitarian intervention, it is important to recognize that in some cases an aggressive state intends to act only or initially within the realm of an MID. Nevertheless, as Vasquez suggests, steps taken during or in reaction to that MID can escalate into war. As discussed below, the issues around which MIDs are framed can determine the likelihood of such escalation. In other cases, of course, leaders of aggressive states will, from the outset, intend to wage war. Even then however, it takes a complicated process to get there. The discussion below also elaborates the stages of that process and the prospect of moving through them. Third, the "steps," "roads," or "paths" to war- however one puts it-imply a qualification: war does not result from a single or inexorable course of action. Rather, "there are quite a few roads to interstate war, and all of them have fairly frequent exit ramps."59 If the idea of human- itarian intervention is considered normatively appealing, the task for institutional design is to encourage warranted humanitarian actions to remain on the road to war (solving the Rwanda problem), and to discourage other military actions.

#### realpolitik allows hard liners to come to power--turns the aff--this is a prerequisite for conflict

**Hagan 98** ([International Decision Making: Leadership Matters](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/5001330005?title=International%20Decision%20Making%3a%20Leadership%20Matters), Magazine article by [Margaret G. Hermann](http://www.questiaschool.com/SM.qst?act=adv&contributors=Margaret%20G.%20Hermann&dcontributors=Margaret%20G.%20Hermann), [Joe D. Hagan](http://www.questiaschool.com/SM.qst?act=adv&contributors=Joe%20D.%20Hagan&dcontributors=Joe%20D.%20Hagan); Foreign Policy, Spring 1998

In the bipolar international system that characterized the Cold War, such a rationale might have seemed reasonable. But today there is little consensus on the nature of the "new world order" and more room for interpretation, innovation, misunderstanding, and miscommunication. In such an ambiguous environment, the perspectives of the leaders involved in foreign policy making can have more influence on what governments do. Moreover, as international constraints on foreign policy have become more flexible and indeterminate, the importance of domestic political concerns has increased. Scholars of international relations have begun to talk not only about different kinds of states democracies, transitional democracies, and autocracies - but also about how domestic political pressures can help to define the state - strong, weak; stable, unstable; cohesive, fragmented; satisfied, revisionist. And they have started to emphasize that government leaders have some choice in the roles that their states play in international politics - doves, hawks; involved, isolationist; unilateral, multilateral; regional, global; pragmatists, radicals. These differences preordain different kinds of reactions within the international arena. Ironically, some of the more interesting illustrations of the effects that leaders and domestic politics can have on world politics have emerged in the very literature that originally dismissed their significance. Researchers have tried to account for why states with similar positions in international affairs have reacted in varied (and often self-defeating) ways. For example, in examining the crises of the 1930s, students of international relations have puzzled over why the democracies of the time reacted in divergent ways to the Great Depression and why they failed to balance against seemingly obvious security threats. Scholars seeking to answer such questions have looked at domestic pressures and leadership arrangements with an eye toward developing a theory of state behavior. Although interest in leaders and domestic politics has ebbed and flowed, scholars who focus on understanding the foreign policy process have made progress in identifying the conditions under which these factors do matter and in specifying the nature of their effects. Building on the research of Graham Allison, Michael Brecher, Alexander George, Morton Halperin, Ole Holsti, Irving Janis, Robert Jervis, Ernest May, James Rosenau, and Richard Snyder, they have explored how leaders perceive and interpret constraints in their international and domestic environments, make decisions, and manage domestic political pressures on their foreign policy choices. These scholars contend that state leaders play a pivotal role in balancing international imperatives with those arising from, or embedded in, domestic politics. What has emerged is a more nuanced picture of the processes that drive and guide the actions of states in world politics. THE ROLE LEADERS PLAY Leaders Perceive and Interpret Constraints Leaders define states' international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments that conform with their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their positions. Such perceptions help frame governments' orientations to international affairs. Leaders' interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context. The view that the world is anarchic - embodied in former secretary of state Henry Kissinger's axiom that "tranquility is not the natural state of the world; peace and security are not the law of nature" - leads to a focus on threats and security, a sense of distrust, and a perceived need for carefully managing the balance of power. Leaders with this view must always remain alert to challenges to their state's power and position in the international system. John Vasquez has argued that the rise to power of militant hardliners who view the world in such realpolitik terms is a crucial prerequisite for war. Thus, the American road to war in Korea and Vietnam was marked first by the demise of former President Franklin Roosevelt's accommodation of nationalism, then by the fall of George Kennan's selective containment strategy, and ultimately by the rise of former secretary of state Dean Acheson's focus on military containment. Describing the vulnerability of empire, Charles Kupchan has observed that the entrenched belief that one's state is "highly vulnerable" has led the leaders of declining states to appease perceived rising powers (consider British behavior before World War II) and encouraged leaders of rising powers to become overly competitive (Wilhelmine Germany before World War I). Drawing on a more optimistic view of human nature, scholars such as Bruce Russett have argued that democracies do not fight one another because democratic leaders assume their peers have peaceful intentions, adhere to cooperative norms, and face domestic political constraints on the use of force. Others such as Ido Oren and John Owen have proposed that leaders who follow a liberal ideology interpret the world in this manner and act accordingly - they place a higher degree of trust in the leaders of countries they currently perceive are democratic.

### War Turns Case

#### War turns gender violence

Eaton 04. [Shana JD Georgetown University Law Center 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 873 Summer lexis]

While sexual violence against women has always been considered a negative side effect of war, it is only in recent years that it has been taken seriously as a violation of humanitarian law. In the "evolution" of war, women themselves have become a battlefield on which conflicts are fought. Realizing that rape is often more effective at achieving their aims than plain killing, aggressors have used shocking sexual violence against women as a tool of conflict, allowing battling forces to flaunt their power, dominance, and masculinity over the other side. The stigma of rape is used to effectuate genocide, destroy communities, and demoralize opponents-decimating a woman's will to survive is often only a secondary side effect. Sexual violence against women during wartime had to reach horrifying levels before the international community was shocked enough to finally take these atrocities seriously. It took the extremely brutal victimization of vast numbers of women, played out against a backdrop of genocide, to prove that rape is not simply a natural side effect of war to be lightly brushed aside. The conflicts in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia put women's rights directly in the spotlight, and the international community could no longer avoid the glare. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing was central to the conflict. Raping women helped to achieve this aim in a number of ways, from forced impregnation, where offspring would have different ethnicities than their mothers, to the use of sexual violence to prevent women from wanting to have sex again (thus limiting their likelihood of bearing children in the future). Additionally, rape was used as a means of destroying families and communities. Raping a woman stigmatized her, making it unlikely that she would ever want to return home, and in many cases, ensuring that if she did return home that she would be rejected. Civilians, particularly women, came to be used as tools to achieve military ends, putting the human rights of these women at the heart of the conflict.

#### War dehumanizes—otherization

Michele Maiese, Conflict Resolution Consortium, “Beyond Intractability Version IV,” The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Co-Directors and Editors, 7—03, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization

Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples. Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community. Such conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties. The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can result in moral exclusion. Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather, international law suggests that they should be treated justly and fairly, with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified. Those excluded from the scope of morality are typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights. Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of people. In severe cases, dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary

### HI Good: O/V 2NC

#### \*\*their ev is based on outdated assumptions

Goldstein 11

Joshua S. Goldstein is professor emeritus of international relations at American University and author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Policy, September/October 2011, "Think Again: War", <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war?page=full>

"Peacekeeping Doesn't Work."¶ It does now. The early 1990s were boom years for the blue helmets, with 15 new U.N. peacekeeping missions launched from 1991 to 1993 -- as many as in the U.N.'s entire history up to that point. The period was also host to peacekeeping's most spectacular failures. In Somalia, the U.N. arrived on a mission to alleviate starvation only to become embroiled in a civil war, and it quickly pulled out after 18 American soldiers died in a 1993 raid. In Rwanda in 1994, a weak U.N. force with no support from the Security Council completely failed to stop a genocide that killed more than half a million people. In Bosnia, the U.N. declared "safe areas" for civilians, but then stood by when Serbian forces overran one such area, Srebrenica, and executed more than 7,000 men and boys. (There were peacekeeping successes, too, such as in Namibia and Mozambique, but people tend to forget about them.)¶ In response, the United Nations commissioned a report in 2000, overseen by veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, examining how the organization's efforts had gone wrong. By then the U.N. had scaled back peacekeeping personnel by 80 percent worldwide, but as it expanded again the U.N. adapted to lessons learned. It strengthened planning and logistics capabilities and began deploying more heavily armed forces able to wade into battle if necessary. As a result, the 15 missions and 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed worldwide today are meeting with far greater success than their predecessors.¶ Overall, the presence of peacekeepers has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood of a war's reigniting after a cease-fire agreement. In the 1990s, about half of all cease-fires broke down, but in the past decade the figure has dropped to 12 percent. And though the U.N.'s status as a perennial punching bag in American politics suggests otherwise, these efforts are quite popular: In a 2007 survey, 79 percent of Americans favored strengthening the U.N. That's not to say there isn't room for improvement -- there's plenty. But the U.N. has done a lot of good around the world in containing war.¶ "Some Conflicts Will Never End."¶ Never say never. In 2005, researchers at the U.S. Institute of Peace characterized 14 wars, from Northern Ireland to Kashmir, as "intractable," in that they "resist any kind of settlement or resolution." Six years later, however, a funny thing has happened: All but a few of these wars (Israel-Palestine, Somalia, and Sudan) have either ended or made substantial progress toward doing so. In Sri Lanka, military victory ended the war, though only after a brutal endgame in which both sides are widely believed to have committed war crimes. Kashmir has a fairly stable cease-fire. In Colombia, the war sputters on, financed by drug revenue, but with little fighting left. In the Balkans and Northern Ireland, shaky peace arrangements have become less shaky; it's hard to imagine either sliding back into full-scale hostilities. In most of the African cases -- Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ivory Coast (notwithstanding the violent flare-up after elections there in late 2010, now resolved) -- U.N. missions have brought stability and made a return to war less likely (or, in the case of Congo and Uganda, have at least limited the area of fighting).¶ Could we do even better? The late peace researcher Randall Forsberg in 1997 foresaw "a world largely without war," one in which "the vanishing risk of great-power war has opened the door to a previously unimaginable future -- a future in which war is no longer socially-sanctioned and is rare, brief, and small in scale." Clearly, we are not there yet. But over the decades -- and indeed, even since Forsberg wrote those words -- norms about wars, and especially about the protection of civilians caught up in them, have evolved rapidly, far more so than anyone would have guessed even half a century ago. Similarly rapid shifts in norms preceded the ends of slavery and colonialism, two other scourges that were once also considered permanent features of civilization. So don't be surprised if the end of war, too, becomes downright thinkable.

### Ext2--Inev

#### B – Landreau concedes politicians will never change their rhetoric because of the MIC

Landreau – their author – 11 John, associate professor of women's and gender studies at The College of New Jersey, “Fighting Words: Obama, Masculinity and the Rhetoric of National Security”, thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory and culture, Vol 10, No 1 (2011)

"The South", then, is a cautionary tale. As long as presidents and politicians dare not challenge the role of the military budget as the primary organizing principle of our economy, and as long as the militarized and masculinized ideology of American exceptionalism remains the almost unitary language with which we speak of national security and foreign policy, there should be no surprise when ostensible doves from the Democratic Party such as Barack Obama pursue large-scale military campaigns in places like Afghanistan, and seem to do so as readily as their reputedly hawkish counterparts in the Republican Party. Alternate strategies to large-scale military violence require new story-lines of national identity and national security. We need to give ourselves a choice about whether taking up the knife is what the situation calls for. We need to ask questions about how we got into such a situation in the first place. We need to create alternatives to the logic that defines security as killing or being killed. Clearly, rhetoric plays a significant role in preparing these choices. But, as Obama's performance indicates, it is unlikely that our presidents and our politicians will do the rhetorical work necessary to disorient the prevailing exceptionalist narrative and reorient the debate towards the ethos of human security. It falls to us - citizens, activists and intellectuals - to turn our political rhetoric away from antagonisms that require violence towards the democratic task of contending with opponents with whom we share the world.

### Ext3--Tea Party

#### Multiple empirical examples prove the GOP will rush to hijack the airwaves and disregard facts

The Atlantic, 10 – Daily Dish, “The Big Lie,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2010/11/the-big-lie/180117/>.

Where does one start? Where one always starts with these things - Jonah Goldberg: Last year, when asked if he believed in American exceptionalism, President Obama responded, "I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism." This reminded me of the wonderful scene in Pixar's "The Incredibles," in which the mom says "everyone's special" and her son replies, "Which is another way of saying no one is." But at least the president made room for the sentiment that America is a special place, even if he chalked it up to a kind of benign provincialism. Oh really? Here is the full Obama quote: I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism. I'm enormously proud of my country and its role and history in the world. If you think about the site of this summit and what it means, I don't think America should be embarrassed to see evidence of the sacrifices of our troops, the enormous amount of resources that were put into Europe postwar, and our leadership in crafting an Alliance that ultimately led to the unification of Europe. We should take great pride in that. And if you think of our current situation, the United States remains the largest economy in the world. We have unmatched military capability. And I think that we have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality, that, though imperfect, are exceptional. Now, the fact that I am very proud of my country and I think that we've got a whole lot to offer the world does not lessen my interest in recognizing the value and wonderful qualities of other countries, or recognizing that we're not always going to be right, or that other people may have good ideas, or that in order for us to work collectively, all parties have to compromise and that includes us. And so I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we create partnerships because we can't solve these problems alone. In other words, Obama emphatically doesn't reduce the idea of American exceptionalism to "benign provincialism." Quite the contrary: he explicitly asserts that the values enshrined in the Constitution are exceptional, and defends them and the US's history in front of a foreign audience. It's worth pointing out this factual error at such length because everyone in the conservative movement has already made it. And that's hardly an exaggeration. Here are Ramesh Ponnuru and Rich Lowry: ...while acknowledging that America has been a force for good, he has all but denied the idea that America is an exceptional nation. Asked whether he believed in American exceptionalism during a European trip last spring, Obama said, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exception­alism.” (Is it just a coincidence that he reached for examples of former hegemons?) They acknowledge here that the full quote should have run (though the original piece remains uncorrected). Said Dinesh D'Souza in his infamous Forbes piece: This is known as American exceptionalism. But when asked at a 2009 press conference whether he believed in this ideal, Obama said no. America, he suggested, is no more unique or exceptional than Britain or Greece or any other country. No surprise that the magazine didn't catch that error during its post-publication fact check - another one of its authors made the same mistake here. Monica Crowley in The Washington Times: During his public life, Barack Obama has often referred to his biracial background and itinerant childhood and has said, "In no other country on Earth is my story even possible." True. But earlier this year, while attending the European summit of the Group of 20 major economic countries, the president was asked if he believed in American exceptionalism. He replied, "I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism, and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism." Here's Victor Davis Hanson: "After all, Obama has rejected in explicit language the notion of American exceptionalism." And Michael Barone: "I believe in American exceptionalism," Obama said on one of his trips to Europe, "just as I suspect that Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism." In other words, not at all. One cannot imagine Presidents Roosevelt, Truman or Kennedy, Eisenhower or Reagan, uttering such sentiments. Here's video of Charles Krauthammer making the same mistake. Ken Blackwell at Townhall: When asked if he believes in American exceptionalism, President Obama said yes, but he was sure that the British and the Belgians also believed in their countries’ exceptionalism. President Obama’s version of American exceptionalism is Lake Woebegon’s children: they’re all above average. Or perhaps, he’d be more at home in Alice in Wonderland’s Caucus Race, where everyone runs and everyone gets prizes. What's especially remarkable about this hackery - and there are numerous other examples - is that these conservative authors don't just egregiously misrepresent the president's actual position. It's that all of them actually cite, as evidence, an out of context line from the very speech that proves their analysis is wrong. You can call this truthiness if you like. Better, the Dish believes, to call it what it is. A deliberate campaign of misinformation. A Big Lie.

## 1NR: Framing

### Ext1--Scenario Planning

#### Scenario debating improves policy outcomes and solves their “prediction bias” args

Francis J. Gavin, Director, Robert s. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas and James B. Steinberg, Dean, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, “The Unknonwn Unknowns,” FOREIGN POLICY, 2—14—12, [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_unknown\_unknowns](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_unknown_unknowns)

How? Imagine a group of experts and statesman meeting off the record, temporarily suspending their desire to predict, blog, or be on television,and spending a day or two intensely debating alternative scenarios that might emerge from a U.S. decision to bomb or not bomb Iran. We are talking about something more than the "war-gaming" that occasionally takes place; this would be a deeper, broader endeavor that looked beyond the immediate consequences of a policy choice in order to reflect upon and wrestle with the longer-term, unknown futures that U.S. actions might bring. A somewhat similar effort was tried before: President Dwight Eisenhower's well-known and successful "Solarium" exercise. Imagine a comparable effort, including both outside experts and government decision-makers, incorporating many of the innovations that have emerged since 1953, such as game theory, scenario planning, and detailed historical case studies Not only might novel policy ideas emerge, but a rigorous vetting of contrasting futures could act as de facto contingency planning should a particular policy choice turn out to be wrong. Such an exercise could also sensitize outside experts to the inherent difficulties, tradeoffs, and unintended consequences of making U.S. foreign policy, which might reduce the shrillness and polarization that often characterize policy debates and make expert knowledge more useful and accessible. The benefits of exercises where pundits and policymakers acknowledge that perfect intelligence is unattainable and where the advantages of both admitting and forgiving honest mistakes about an unknowable, uncertain future are recognized, would be enormous. If nothing else, the humility and flexibility that ensued could lead to more-effective long-range policies. Although such a process may not tell us whether bombing Iran or not is "right," it will better prepare us for the unexpected, unintended, and challenging consequences that will surely result, regardless of which policy is chosen. Given the enormous long-term stakes of the choices before the U.S. president, it is the least that policymakers and experts can do.

#### extinction threats solve structural violence

Joanna Macy, Adjunct Professor, California Institute for Integral Studies, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: A READER, 2K, p. 243.

The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function of the dangers that are threatening to overwhelm us. We are confronted by social breakdown, wars, nuclear proliferation, and the progressive destruction of our biosphere. Polls show that people today are aware that the world, as they know it, may come to an end. This loss of certainty that there will be a future is the pivotal psychological reality of our time. Over the past twelve years my colleagues and I have worked with tens of thousands of people in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, helping them confront and explore what they know and feel about what is happening to their world. The purpose of this work, which was first known as “Despair and Empowerment Work,” is to overcome the numbing and powerlessness that result from suppression of painful responses to massively painful realities. As their grief and fear for the world is allowed to be expressed without apology or argument and validated as a wholesome, life-preserving response, people break through their avoidance mechanisms, break through their sense of futility and isolation. Generally what they break through into is a larger sense of identity. It is as if the pressure of their acknowledged awareness of the suffering of our world stretches or collapses the culturally defined boundaries of the self. It becomes clear, for example, that the grief and fear experienced for our world and our common future are categorically different from similar sentiments relating to one’s personal welfare. This pain cannot be equated with dread of one’s own individual demise. Its source lies less in concerns for personal survival than in apprehensions of collective suffering – of what looms for human life and other species and unborn generations to come. Its nature is akin to the original meaning of compassion – “suffering with.” It is the distress we feel on behalf of the larger whole of which we are a part. And, when it is so defined, it serves as a trigger or getaway to a more encompassing sense of identity, inseparable from the web of life in which we are as intricately connected as cells in a larger body. This shift in consciousness is an appropriate, adaptive response. For the crisis that threatens our planet, be it seen in its military, ecological, or social aspects, derives from a dysfunctional and pathogenic notion of the self. It is a mistake about our place in the order of things. It is the delusion that the self is so separate and fragile that we must delineate and defend its boundaries, that it is so small and needy that we must endlessly acquire and endlessly consume, that it is so aloof that we can – as individuals, corporations, nation-states, or as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.

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## Rest of 1NR

I’ve lost the document- it was just extending politics (iran) though so nothing too important